

# RACMP POINTSMAN

## MAGAZINE



Cover photograph: Colonel Tim Grützner, PM ADF

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# A message from the Provost Marshal – Army

## LTCOL Mark Luscombe

It is usual at this time of the year to reflect on the "year that was". It is undeniable that we are working in an environment of significant change and at a time of high operational tempo. 2008 has been a busy year for us all, but it is an exciting time for Army and the RACMP. As a Corps we have provided the RACMP input to influence force development so that we keep pace with the continuous change that characterises the modern military environment.

The Pointsman magazine continues to evolve and this year under the editorship of Major Mick Pemberton we have attempted to further broaden the nature of the publication. That is something that will continue. I specifically want to thank the authors of articles, particularly where their contribution relates to wider Corps matters. Hopefully you will find some of the articles thought provoking and feel motivated to have your say or indeed to consider an article of your own for 2009, maybe about a topic of personal interest or about something you see as being fundamental for the Corps. I expect that some of the articles will prompt some debate or comment. I hope so.

Change continues. The new Chief of Army Lieutenant General Ken Gillespie, AO, DSC, CSM has released a Chief of Army Directive – "Adaptive Army" that will result in Army transitioning to new Army Headquarters and Functional Command structures. This is a major change that will result in changes to the organisational placement of Military Police to fit these new higher level command structures. The 1st Military Police Battalion and Defence Police Training Centre have continued to implement their Unit Establishment Reviews as they move to Army 2016, and we have already started looking beyond that to ensure our relevance in Army and the wider ADF. These challenges will be ongoing.



At his recent ADF Farewell Parade the Governor General His Excellency Major General Michael Jeffrey AC, CVO, MC reflected on the changes in operational tempo he has seen during his time of service. He reflected "that in the 1980s there were just 16 ADF operational deployments involving just over 1,000 personnel. In the 1990s there were 82 operational deployments involving nearly 17,000 personnel. Astoundingly, more than 45,000 ADF personnel have taken part in deployments

between 2001 and 2007 – with almost 35,000 in the last three years alone. And this year some 12,000 personnel will be added to that figure." Military Police continue to be an important part of many of those deployments, particularly those in the 1st Military Police Battalion and Australian Defence Force Investigative Service, who have seen their members deployed and on operations in the Middle East, Afghanistan, East Timor, Malaysia, Solomon Islands and the Sinai.



Next year will see changes at the RACMP senior command level with Colonel Tim Grutzner, AM the Provost Marshal Australian Defence Force and Commander of the Australian Defence Force Investigative Service, Lieutenant Colonel Murray Heron the Commanding Officer 1st Military Police Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Peter Fisher the Commandant Defence Police Training Centre and Lieutenant Colonel Nan Bahr the Deputy Head of Corps moving on posting. The Corps has been well served during their tenure and I wish them well in their future endeavours as I do all who are moving on posting in 2009. I warmly welcome and congratulate Colonel Martyn Reed, Lieutenant Colonels Rohan Jayawardena, Gary Vale and Sally Reeves to their new appointments.

A great deal has been achieved during 2008. A successful RACMP Corps Conference was conducted in early April and working groups tackled a number of key Corps issues which are being progressed.

An RACMP working group attended the Force Development Group and developed an Army After Next (2020-2040) Military Police Concept Paper to influence wider Army force development and guide the RACMP aspects of Army capability development. The concept paper has been well received and is soon to go to the Chief of Army's Senior Advisory Committee for endorsement. When endorsed, it will provide direction for the development of RACMP Army Capability Requirements.

RACMP input has been provided to a draft CDF Directive – ADF/AFP Interoperability that will see the PM ADF in conjunction with Naval Police Coxswains, RACMP, RAAF Security Police and the Defence Security Authority provide specialist advice and doctrine on policing and security that supports Defence and contributes to Defence/AFP interoperability. PM ADF will be a member of the Joint Steering Committee on Defence and Australian Federal Police (AFP) Interoperability.

Captain Damian Eaton has developed a supporting operational and tactical interoperability framework and written a paper addressing the role of RACMP in interoperability with the AFP for peace and stability operations. While the AFP is now a major contributor as a part of the Whole of Government approach to these types of operations there is still a unique place for RACMP.

Recruiting and Retention, RACMP Career Development and RACMP Capability Development Projects are well underway.

The upgraded Defence Police & Security Management System is now rolled out and working well across Army.

A new Trade Model has been developed for RACMP by the Defence Police Training Centre and is soon to go to the Defence Force Remuneration Tribunal. The model recognises close personal protection operators and military working dog handlers as specialists under a new Military Police Grade Three employment category. It also includes ab initio recruiting for RACMP, in limited numbers, which for the first time will provide Defence Force Recruiting with a target to recruit people with the required qualifications and skill set for direct recruitment to RACMP.

Importantly for the Corps the significance of the RACMP unique Law Enforcement function, a capability that does not exist elsewhere in Army has been recognised. The Chief of Army's Advisory Committee recently agreed to the re-establishment of a Domestic Policing Unit (DPU) comprising 78 personnel for Army. This will commence in January 2009 and will re-establish a dedicated policing capability to Army able to provide general duties policing, and investigation into minor crime (Service Police Investigator qualified), for garrisons within Australia. The sections will be located in Darwin, Townsville, Brisbane, Oakey, Holsworthy, Randwick, Singleton, Canberra, Wagga Wagga, Wodonga, Puckapunyal, Melbourne, Adelaide and Perth with an initial priority to Training Command Establishments. The DPU is a Military Justice Initiative that satisfies the Defence response to the 2006 Defence Investigative Capability Audit, satisfies the demand for dedicated MP at key Training Command Establishments, provides a broader base for recruitment to the ADFIS, develops MP experienced in the law enforcement function for the 1st Military Police Battalion and allows it to focus on its operational role.

An ongoing responsibility for some years now has been the writing of good Corps doctrine. I am happy to say that we have been well served by Majors Mark Langdon and Ian Smith who over a number of years now have put significant effort into getting our doctrine in order. In this era of continuous change that characterises the modern military environment, our doctrine

will be continually under review. Our Internment and Detention doctrine is part written and will hopefully be complete by the end of 2008, allowing their attention to transfer to updating LWD 0-1-3 Military Police.

As the Head of Corps I have been able to get out and visit military police in locations around Australia, generally with the Colonel Commandant Colonel John Cook and the Corps RSM Warrant Officer Class One Ken Bullman, OAM. The visits have reinforced the complexities Lieutenant Colonel Heron has faced in commanding such a geographically spread and diverse unit, the strong relationships the military police and ADFIS have been able to establish with local area commanders, and also the quality of our people and the effort being put in to support Army. I have been impressed with the change that has occurred as the ADFIS has established itself, molding three quite separate policing cultures to form an effective new ADF investigative capability.

Special congratulations to all who have been recognised with honours, awards, commendations, certificates of merit and been promoted. Well done. I would particularly like to congratulate Warrant Officer Class One Ken Bullman for being awarded the Medal of the Order of Australia, a just reward for his many years of dedicated service to the Army and RACMP.

Just as you have been busy, so have the Provost Marshal – Army staff. Major Mick Pemberton, Captains Ruth Weir and Greg Mitchell and Sergeant Damien Able have pulled their sleeves up and supported not only the Provost Marshal – Army responsibilities but also many that relate to the Head of Corps function to supplement the good work of Lieutenant Colonel Nan Bahr and Majors Phil Chapman and Nick Rose. I am indebted to them for their efforts.

As the festive season approaches we naturally start to think of spending time with our families. I acknowledge the important role our families have played in supporting us throughout the year and thank them.

My best wishes to you and your families for a safe and happy Christmas season, and for the year ahead. Finally let's ensure we remember our Army and Corps colleagues who are deployed and will not be with their families at Christmas. To all of those who are on operations go our very best wishes.

For the Troops and With the Troops.



# Corps Notes from the Colonel Commandant

## COL John Cook

To quote a couple of sentences from the Chief of Army's first Order of the Day in July this year *"our people are not just a fundamental input to capability – they are our capability. They are not a priority – they are the priority for the Army"*.

I believe this sets a benchmark for the whole purpose of recruitment, training and retention. This Corps has a small establishment to service the needs of a growing Army. Apart from any increase to the manpower establishment to do its tasks, existing positions need to be filled and Military Police personnel be retained, having been employed and tasked in such a manner that they wish to continue serving in both the Corps and the Army. The ongoing leadership challenge is for the Corps to make this happen.

The Corps maintains its high operational profile, committed to the Middle East, Afghanistan and East Timor. It is also represented by other individual appointments to the RCB Butterworth, Solomon Islands and the UN Force in the Sinai, in total some 32 RACMP personnel are deployed on overseas tasks, which include Close Personal Protection (CPP) duties, general MP tasks and investigative tasks by ADFIS Major Investigative Teams (MIT) deployed to the Middle East and elsewhere as required. The 1st Military Police Battalion reorganisation has completed its first stage with some personnel relocation and the renaming of its Companies, as it further develops its operational capability.

The Australian Defence Force Investigative Service (ADFIS), tri-Service with Navy, Army, Air Force and Australian Public Service members, includes a group of experienced RACMP investigators. It continues to develop its state-of-the-art investigative capability as it builds upon its links with supported Commanders and units, together with other external law enforcement



agencies. I also stress the importance of further extending the RACMP/ADFIS relationship as RACMP will continue to be the source of investigator recruiting to its Army component.

The Garrison Policing Plan for the Army is in its final stage, prior to its scheduled introduction in 2009. It is based on a MP Company structure, to be commanded from the Office of the Provost Marshal - Army (OPM - A) and it will gradually be established with manpower and equipment over the next few years, its development subject to the availability of Defence funding. This is another important aspect of Military Policing as it will reconnect the Corps support to Commanders and their military areas within Australia.

December 2008, sees the departure of two senior Corps Officers to non Corps appointments. Lt Col Murray Heron, CO 1st MP Bn, to Instructor at the Royal Malaysian Staff College and Lt Col Peter Fisher, Commandant DPTC, to SO1 Personnel HQ PNG. They have given long and dedicated service to the training and field roles of the

Corps. I sincerely thank them for their many years of support to the Corps and their personal support to me since 2001. On behalf of the Corps, I also extend our best wishes to Murray, Peter and their families in their new appointments. Finally, I welcome Lt Col Rohan Jayawardena as the incoming CO 1st MP Bn and Lt Col Gary Vale as Comdt DPTC, and; I warmly welcome our 'lateral transfers' from RMP in the UK and also MP in South Africa, all these new Corps members bringing a wealth of experience, both field and investigational, to the Corps.

From a Corps and MP Association perspective, the Military Police Plaque Dedication, AWM Canberra, in September last year was a great success, both for the historic reasons and for resulting in increased camaraderie between the serving and former members of the Corps. With some 360 personnel and families at the Ceremony, I thank all who attended and those who assisted in its organisation.

With financial constraints upon the Army and the Corps, it is even more important for the continuance of maintaining the highest standards of soldiering and support to the Army. Your commitment is still at the forefront, as is your dedication to duty on your operational deployments. As always, I am very impressed with that commitment with little resources. My congratulations to those in their new appointments and to those Corps members who have received their recent promotions. As the Christmas season approaches, especially remember those on operational service together with their families at home. Also a thought for those Corps members who have passed away this year and those who are unwell.

My best wishes to you and to your families over the Christmas period and for the New Year ahead.



# From the desk of the RACMP Corps RSM

## WO1 Ken Bullman, OAM

It was with great pleasure that I took up my appointment this year as the RSM of the Defence Police Training Centre and at long last I am posted to a unit that is all in one postcode. In addition I have the privilege of holding the appointment as the Corps RSM and will continue to engage with as many members on Corps matters during my time. I welcome WO1 Scott Upston into his new appointment as RSM 1 MP Bn and farewell WO1 Greg Westhead from DPTC as he moves onto CATC at Puckapunyal.

Demands from the Chief of Army have required the Corps to refocus its role and structure. The current operational tempo of Defence has demanded a highly skilled, flexible workforce, able to be deployed at short notice. The skills and knowledge of our members has increased substantially to keep pace with the operational demands, along with the expectation of an Army continually redefining its own role. To ensure the Corps is in the best position to meet the intent of the Chief of Army our Corps employment category manager has put forward a proposal for an employment category restructure, revised trade training and financial benefits. It is a lengthy process with many hours being committed to the project. To date the proposal has been agreed to in principle; however the process must still run its course with what I can only see as positive changes for the employment structure of the Corps. Coupled with this is a review of course content by our training development staff to ensure training meets the here and now and more importantly will take us into the future and ensure students leaving DPTC are best prepared to meet future demands.



Over the past couple of years there have been unit establishment reviews across the Corps which has seen change in all locations that the Corps is represented. The noticeable change is the increase of military police positions. One small increase but worthy of mention is the introduction of Corporal instructors at Initial Section DPTC. Across Army the Corporal is seen as the back bone of the organisation and at long last our Corporals are now intimately involved in the basic training of our future service police. I use this opportunity to advertise these positions to the wider Corps in order to encourage our Corporals to consider a posting to DPTC as an instructor

and be directly involved in preparing our newest members for life in the Corps.

Our troops continue to be committed to dynamic environments whilst on operations overseas with no let up in sight. They are to be congratulated for their dedication and efforts with some now on their second and third tours of particular areas. In saying this, the families should also be congratulated for the constant support and commitment as they play an important role during the continued high tempo period for the Corps on operations and in training.

On regimental matters, the Corps Regimental Dinner was attended by a good number of our members at a fitting occasion to celebrate the Corps 92nd birthday. The dinner closed a productive week in which the Corps Conference was conducted and as a result several key topics were explored and papers prepared for Army Headquarters on Corps capability, interoperability and recruiting and retention. The RACMP Regimental Instructions which provide information, policy and guidance on Corps matters have been reviewed and are now available on the Head of Corps web site for use by all our members.

I would like to congratulate all that successfully attended courses and for those that will receive well earned promotions. I also congratulate those that received Service and Corps awards for the service and the fine example you have set for others.

Finally I would like to pass on my best wishes to all during the festive season and trust all will return fresh for the New Year.



# From the Editor's Desk

To say the least it has been a very exciting experience this year being the Editor of the *Pointsman* Magazine. I would like to thank all those who have contributed in making this year's magazine a bumper effort.

It was very much a 'doom and gloom' start to the year with the news that the publication of the *Pointsman* Magazine was in jeopardy. This was due to the previous publishing company 900 degrees informing us that they could no longer publish our magazine due to financial constraints. With a little bit of 'this and that' we have been able to secure a new publisher in

Hallmark Editions in Melbourne. It is hoped that we can establish a long term relationship with Hallmark Editions to ensure that a first class magazine is produced.

I am sure that this years *Pointsman* Magazine will be an enjoyable read for all past and present members and anyone else who gets the chance to read it. I take this opportunity to inform all readers that the magazine cannot flourish without individuals taking the time to submit articles and photographs. So if you have something to say, and it is printable, then send it in.

In an attempt to develop the *Pointsman* Magazine as a means of

spreading the MP word we have included feature articles by various RACMP members. These articles give the opportunity to examine and discuss how we do our business and hopefully will generate other members to use the *Pointsman* as a means of delivering future discussion and development.

This year's magazine contains some excellent insights into the past and present with contributions from 1 MP Bn, DPTC and ADFIS. SGT Antony Buckingham has once again done his research and produced two quality articles from the past. There must be more 'budding historians' out there so it is over to you to do your research and make submissions. In this years edition we have attempted to address current issues that we as a Corps face and especially promote discussion with the intent that individuals will 'pick up the ball and run with it'. The emphasis being placed on capability development and finding exactly where we fit in the big scheme of things.

Finally to all I take this opportunity to wish you and your families well for the festive season, and I hope that 2009 brings contentment and happiness.

**Correspondence to the *Pointsman* can be made via letters to the editor, via the email address [michael.pemberton@defence.gov.au](mailto:michael.pemberton@defence.gov.au) or mailed to the editor *Pointsman* Magazine, Major Michael Pemberton Office of the Provost Marshal - Army, PO Box 7946 Canberra BC, ACXT 2610**





# Military Police support to ADF Operations

Regional insecurity and the continuation of international conflicts requires that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is able to provide capable and ready personnel to respond to an ever increasing list of operational deployments and domestic response commitments. These operational commitments extend across the entire spectrum of operations from peace support operations to war fighting.

As a unique capability within the ADF, 1 MP Bn is required to continuously sustain support to operations whilst also meeting its raise, train and sustain obligations and a growing need for domestic general duties policing support. 1 MP Bn's current commitment to operations is 32 people across five operations, which coupled with the requirement to train and prepare the next rotation for deployment and to rest

personnel returning from operational deployments constitutes approximately 50% of the fulltime manpower pool.

1 MP Bn's success in meeting its operational and domestic responsibilities is only possible through a concerted effort at all levels within the Unit to develop highly proficient personnel committed to providing Military Police support in all types of operational environments.



# Operation Astute

OP ASTUTE is the ADF contribution to the Australian Government's response to a request from the Government of Timor-Leste to assist in restoring peace and stability to their country.

1 MP Bn has deployed personnel on OP ASTUTE since 2006 providing a number of capabilities including General Duties Policing, Internment and Detention management and Military Police Dog support. This support can be traced back to the initial deployment of Military Police as part of INTERFET during OP WARDEN in 1999. Since 2006 the emphasis has changed from a focus on detention operations during the initial uprisings, to support to population control operations and the apprehension of high value targets. Due to the success of the operation and the relative calm that now exists within the major population areas the main effort for MPs has transitioned to force protection, law and order operations and basic, but still vitally important, battlefield circulation control tasks such as TCPs and vehicle checks.

OP ASTUTE has provided 1 MP Bn with a valuable opportunity to develop and showcase the full range of military police capabilities.

### Joint Provost Marshal function

The JPM function is a key enabler in ensuring that the JTF Comd is provided with reliable advice on law and order issues, detention and the correct employment of MP resources allocated to the JTF. This position has provided an excellent opportunity to develop the credibility of RACMP within the ADF and provides the justifi-



Patrolling the streets in Dili

cation to seek the establishment of JPM appointments in other theatres.

### Military Police Support Team

The MPST is based on a MP section. The MPST is responsible for providing MP support to the JTF 631 Headquarters. Where previously this element was raised from nominations from across the Bn, the last three MPST deployments have been tasked to respective sub-units to raise from within their own ranks. The success of these deployments has demonstrated the high standards and the depth of professionalism at section level within the sub-units. Of particular note is the fact that the MPST about to deploy to East Timor as part of the TLBG-5 rotation is made up entirely of

ARes members and proves the ability of C Coy 1 MP Bn to provide fully deployable MP capability bricks up to section level.

### Military Police Dog Team

The greatest success story for RACMP to emerge from OP ASTUTE is undoubtedly the successful integration of the RACMP MPD capability within the Timor-Leste Battalion Group. The MPD capability has continued to evolve with each deployment refining the specific training and animal husbandry required to provide handlers and dogs that are able to work in the inhospitable East Timorese environment. The MPD Platoon within D Coy 1 MP Bn can now proudly claim to be the ADF's most experienced organisation in relation to the training and deployment of MPD on operations.







# Operation Catalyst

Operation Catalyst is the ADF contribution to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Iraq. The ADF continues to contribute to Multi-National Force efforts to develop a secure and stable environment in Iraq, assist national recovery programs and facilitate the transition to Iraq self-government.

Central to 1 MP Bn's commitment is a CPP Detachment as part of the Australian Security Detachment (SECDET). The CPP Detachment is responsible for protecting the Australian Ambassador to Iraq. 1 MP Bn's other support to OP CATALST has evolved overtime as Australia's presence in the Middle East Area of Operations (MEAO) has evolved.

Following the appointment of a two star General to the COMD JTF 633 appointment in 2007 a RACMP CPP liaison officer position was created to provide close protection to the Commander and assist his

personal staff to ensure that personal security requirements were in place. 1 MP Bn also provided a MP advisor position on Overwatch Battle Group-West (OBG-W) until the Battle Group was redeployed in mid 2008.

## The SECDET CPP Detachment

The SECDET CPP Detachment has been the engine room for the development of the CPP capability within RACMP. Before SECDET the fledgling CPP capability was struggling to retain credibility within the ADF with limited opportunities for deployment or the ability to develop an experienced core of CPP operators. With SECDET now up to its 14th rotation the RACMP CPP capability has matured to a level where RACMP CPP is recognised within Army as an effective professional capability that has been formally integrated into the force protection options available for the protection of designated

VIP. The RACMP CPP capability is now grounded in the skills and knowledge of a significant number of officers and soldiers who have planned, practiced and successfully conducted CPP while operating in a complex combined arms environment in one of the most dangerous places on earth.

The selection of a RACMP CPP operator to provide protection to COMD JTF 633 can be attributed to the credibility that the SECDET CPP detachment has earned over successive rotations. The CPP advisor is selected from the most experienced CPP operators within the Corps and demands a 24 hour a day commitment for the duration of the deployment. The creation of this position has also provided 1 MP Bn with the ability to establish strategic situational awareness within the MEAO, which is a significant force multiplier in allowing 1 MP Bn to successfully plan and conduct short notice CPP tasks in the MEAO.





Who said it's hot. LT Kat Clarke experiences snow in Afghanistan

# Operation Slipper

Australia's contribution to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan is an important component of the Australian Government's commitment to working together with the international community to help prevent acts of terrorism around the world. The Reconstruction Task Force (RTF) has a clearly defined role to work on reconstruction and improvement of provincial infrastructure (schools, hospitals, bridges, security points etc) and community based projects to assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan achieve a stable and secure future for its people.

1 MP Bn's support to OP SLIPPER is divided between the provision of a Detention Centre Manager as part the RTF to provide specialist Military Police advice on policing and detention operations within the OP SLIPPER theatre of operations, including support to the Special Operations Task Group (SOTG); and the provision of two CPP qualified drivers to support the Commander and Deputy Commander of the SOTG.

Australia does not have the responsibility for detention operations within Afghanistan, but it does have a responsibility to ensure that all people who are detained by Australian troops, either through RTF or SOTG operations, are handled in accordance with the requirements and conventions of international humanitarian law and

that they are formally handed over to the coalition force responsible for their long term detention. The Detention Manager works closely with the Force legal officer to ensure that Australia maintains the highest standards of conduct in relation to the handling of detainees and the application of international humanitarian law. The Detention Centre Manager is the cornerstone that provides the ADF with the potential to establish an Australian detention capability, with additional MP support, in the future if required. The Detainee Manager is also responsible for providing Military Police advice within the SOTG and RTF and is required to work closely with ADFIS in response to incidents within the AO.

The opportunity to provide members to fill the COMD SOTG and DCOMD SOTG driver positions was readily accepted by 1 MP Bn. Although not specifically in CPP roles 1 MP Bn provides two CPP operators to OP SLIPPER. The positions provide an opportunity to expose CPP operators to a demanding role where they can hone their individual skills and provides the SOTG commanders with a heightened level of protection that would not normally be provided if the positions were filled by ECN 109 qualified drivers.



Transit Security Element boarding party

# Operation Resolute

The ADF's domestic maritime security activities are conducted under Operation RESOLUTE. Operation RESOLUTE commenced on 17 July 2006 and streamlines the ADF's contribution to Australian whole-of-government efforts to protect Australia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Operation RESOLUTE consolidates previous ADF operations including Operation RELEX II (focussing on unauthorised arrivals), Operation CRANBERRY (illegal fishing and smuggling), Operation CELESTA and MISTRAL (patrols of Australia's southern ocean EEZ), and patrols protecting Australia's gas and oil infrastructure.

1 MP Bn's commitment to OP RESOLUTE is to provide two MPs on designated notice to move as part of the Transit Security Element (TSE). The TSE undertake intelligence lead maritime patrols out of Darwin, over a three month period of duty, to intercept illegal immigrants attempting the sea crossing into Australian territorial waters. The MP role within the TSE is to provide advice on, and

support the collection of evidence during boarding operations and to supervise the handling and detention of illegal immigrants who are arrested by the TSE until they can be handed over to immigration officials. The TSE is mounted out of Darwin, therefore this support has become a standing task for B Coy, 1 MP Bn. Tasking B Coy reduces the amount of time required to be away from home locations for personnel not posted to Darwin, and also creates a pool of personnel who have completed the mandatory seamanship training that is required before naval operations can be conducted.

The success of OP RESOLUTE and the complementary AFP operations in Indonesia have resulted in a significant reduction in the number of illegal immigrants attempting the crossing to Australia. As a result the majority of OP RESOLUTE patrols are now conducted by RAN Patrol boats which are able to conduct TSE operations utilising the Coxswain posted to the Patrol boat to provide Service police support. However, the need to maintain MP on call is still required in case large scale illegal movements are identified.



## Rifle Company Butterworth

While not officially an operational deployment Rifle Company Butterworth (RCB) is an overseas appointment that demands the same level of professionalism, commitment and knowledge as the operations already listed. 1 MP Bn maintains a staggered three month deployment of two MP CPLs to RCB to provide a minor criminal investigation and general duties capability. The RCB deployment is currently the best opportunity available to a MP JNCO to develop experience and confidence in conduct of general duties policing.

The RCB MPs work under an ADFIS Investigator who is posted to Malaysia for a two year period as a member of the 2/30 Training Group, with a focus on investigations within South- East Asia. The detachment spends most of its time in liaison with local police and business owners, or planning and testing routes between RCB and other Land Command, South-East Asian Combined Training exercise locations. The RCB MP's focus is on assisting the Australian Rifle Company sized contingent that is rotated through Malaysia every three months. They provide a standby 24-hour patrol while the company is in location at the Butterworth air base and deploy with the RCB on exercises.

### CONCLUSION

The ADF's operational tempo shows no signs of slowing down in the near future. For 1 MP Bn this means that the tremendous opportunities for developing RACMP capabilities under operational conditions will continue, with the possibility for more deployments as RACMPs credibility grows, especially in the areas of detention management, and short notice CPP tasks



MP on patrol in Butterworth

## Domestic Policing Commitments



MP Escort Duties

As well as maintaining operational commitments overseas, 1 MP Bn has a responsibility to maintain personnel on high readiness to respond to domestic incidents within Australia, ranging from terrorist incidents to emergency response to natural disasters. Everyday of the year 1 MP Bn maintains a roster of personnel who are on call to respond to incidents that may occur anywhere in Australia. For a Unit the size of 1 MP Bn, the ability to maintain this level of readiness is a testament to the professionalism of its members, particularly the JNCO who bear the burden for maintaining a status of continuous readiness.



# Military Police support to ADF Operations

AUSTRALIAN  
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MOBILITY  
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**MP**

1<sup>ST</sup> MILITARY POLICE BATTALION

For career opportunities within RACMP visit <http://intranet.defence.gov.au/armyweb/Sites/1MP>

## Operation Astute 2008

By CPL Adam Boyd

OPERATION ASTUTE is the Australian Defence Force contribution to the Australian Governments response to a request from the government of Timor-Leste to assist in restoring peace and stability to their country. Members of 1st Military Police Battalion deployed to Timor-Leste in support of the International Stabilisation Force JTF631 mission to assist

the Government and the United Nations to bring peace and stability, security and confidence to the Timorese people and to allow the people of Timor to resolve their differences democratically and peacefully.

For the second time in the last 12 months the deployed General Duties Military Police Section to OP ASTUTE comprised both an equal mix of GRES and ARA personnel





from various companies around Australia within 1 MP Bn. Upon arriving in country in Mid September 2007 the new MP section was given a very rushed handover/takeover and baptism of fire due to the fact that the new members had never deployed to Timor Leste before and had no previous deployment experience. To say that all members were flying by the seat of their pants for the first few weeks would be an understatement. Security operations formed a very large and integral part of daily life for the MP section, with the escort of the AS Ambassador on a daily and nightly basis between key locations and the escort of many high profile VIP's and dignitaries. The highlight of these escorts for the MP section involved the CDF, CJOPS, USN Pacific Fleet Comd, 3 Bde Comd, Channel 7 news crew, USS Port Royal, the AS Prime Minister and the many entertainers from the Tour De Force, including everybody's favourite Krystal from Big Brother. The MP section also conducted many law and order enforcement patrols throughout Dili and all ISF FOB's. These patrols were a critical asset to COMD JTF631 as they allowed him to reinforce the Comd intent in relation to force protection and the force posture policy.

Throughout the tour the MP section formed a close working relationship with many agencies such as United Nations Police (UNPOL) and the East Timor Defence Force (F-FDTL) Military Police. This close relationship with the F-FDTL



MP's allowed us to participate in some critical skills transfer training between the two agencies. The MP section also made many positive and thoughtful gestures to the many Aid and NGO agencies in and around Dili. One highlight of these actions would have been the well organised and implemented Christmas Party held at the Dominican Orphanage in Dili. One of the sisters at the orphanage was overheard saying that this is the first time Santa has ever visited this orphanage. This was not just the only outstanding contribution made by members of the section that didn't involve MP duties. The AUSKICK Clinic that was set up by the previous GD MP Sect was also taken onboard by the new section and was a great chance to get away from the

fast action of the MP world at Camp Phoenix and just relax and have a kick of the footy with local kids while still strengthening ties with the local community. I would have to say the highlight of the trip for myself and some of the other members in the section was being invited to attend the President of Timor Leste, Dr Jose Ramos Horta's 58th birthday party held at his private residence, although he could have warned us first that what we were eating was dog and monkey, thanks Mr Presidente. Overall this deployment was an excellent opportunity for all members to further develop their Military Police skills and put into real life all the years of practice and training. The dedication and professionalism of all General Duties Military Police members of the third OP ASTUTE rotation have been praised and thanked by all agencies they have worked close with thus bringing great credit and praise to their training and 1st Military Police Battalion and the corps of Military Police.

**Author:** CPL Boyd enlisted in May 1996 to the RAINF. After serving for 6 years in that corps, he transferred to RACT where he deployed on RCB 68 as the TPT Supervisor. In Aug 2005 CPL Boyd transferred to RACMP and participated in Op Acolyte. In Sep 2007 CPL Boyd deployed with TLBG 3 to Timor Leste as part of the General Duties Military Police Section JTF 631. CPL Boyd is still currently serving on CFTS as the C Coy S7 and Doctrine Cell Training Corporal.





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# SECDET XII MP CLOSE PERSONAL PROTECTION TEAM (CPPT)

By Captain Nathan Pierpoint

The members assigned as the SECDET XII MP CPPT initially congregated for MRT over the period 14 – 27 May 07. There, in Sydney, the member's revived old friendships and commenced new ones. The larrikins were quickly identified, and the heat seekers were not far behind. Overall, the team bonded very well and enjoyed getting back into the CPP role ahead of their upcoming deployment. I only spent a little time with the team as I was off on my recon with the OC and XO SECDET XII. The recon gave us a fairly good indication of what we would face in about four months time - especially the heat. I must say I was used to the humidity of Australia, but was unaware of just how hot it actually got in the Middle East. RSO&I training was "interesting" and shed a new light on how our logistical brethren were helping others into the MEAO.


Back in Australia we prepared for our concentration period with 6RAR as our mounting HQ. Most members, as usual, were flying in from all around Australia, and whilst the prospect of a few months in Queensland was in the back of everyone's mind, most were disappointed to

leave their families for more training. I was extremely lucky that the majority of the team had deployed before on SECDET, and were able to provide both myself and the senior command element of SECDET with some insight to life in Baghdad. Most other elements had not had any members deploy on SECDET previously, let alone assist in the conduct of an operation as complex as this one. The MPs worked hard to ensure that the other elements had a good grasp of the roles and responsibilities of all members of the combat team which assisted us in gaining a lot of respect and admiration from the rest of the elements. As a whole, all elements gelled well, friends were made, jokes were played, photos were taken and morale was kept high.

After an intense couple of weeks training it was time to put all our good work into the MRE, the CTC run exercise testing us on our individual and collective capabilities. The MRE helped to identify a number of key issues relating to the development of our Combat Team MAP process and the inputs required by other force elements. In all, our drills and skills

were tested reasonably well, and the SOPs we had developed allowed us to successfully complete the mission. By the end of this exercise everyone was looking forward to a good break before the impending deployment. This was the last opportunity most members would have to spend with their families and thus made the most of their time with spouses and children and tried to forget the milestones they would miss during their time away.

The team deployed at the start of September, and into the last part of the MEAO's blistering summer. Some were used to the heat from their last tours but others, like Smithy, were left to burn to a crisp (note: CPL Smith had to use approx 1L of SPF 30+ per day otherwise he was at risk of turning a rather bright shade of 'beetroot' if required to spend any more than 5 mins out in the sun). This time the RSO+I package was designed by the senior command element of the SECDET and thus proved a lot more relevant and worthwhile than the one I conducted on my recon. I would implore anyone going over to the MEAO to conduct the medical training held in Camp Beuhring before they enter their respective AO's. This is run by US ex Special Forces types who provided a common sense, no holds barred, relevant medical training, orientated to our AO and the types of threats and wounds commonly faced in the area. Additionally, most members found and maintained a healthy relationship with Green Beans, the US owned coffee shop that is found on most US bases. During the warmer weather most got stuck into the frappaccino's, however the older few stuck with the common latte. Concerns were raised when one member from the team was getting up before 0430h local time IOT be the first one there of a morning, when it was suggested that he may be just a little dehydrated and should be drinking water instead (by the medic) the



CPP team carrying out extraction training





member stated that water did not give him the appropriate 'buzz' for the day. Green Beans opened three more stores around the MEAO based off the money invested by a number of our team I'm sure. I dread what their families will go through when they are back home and cannot get the same 'fix' from the normal Australian coffee as what they are used to from Green Beans.

Soon enough we were on our way up to Baghdad and quickly getting a handover from SECDET XI. The handover was (and commonly is) a blur; an overload of information and more training to ensure the team is in good shape from day one of the takeover. The team were keen and excited to take over, so it wasn't long before the guys were chomping at the bit to get around and take part in as many jobs as possible. After a long and hard deployment, the boys from SECDET XI were more than happy to handover as quickly as possible and take a much needed rest. As the new boys in town we revelled in the opportunity to do as much as possible and, I would be confident in saying that, barring a few olds and bolds, not many of us slept all that much in the first few days.


After the handover we definitely kicked off with a flurry of business. The current Ambassador prefers to meet people in person rather than have conversations over

the phone, so a usual day would cover anywhere between 5 to 11 meetings with a dinner thrown in almost every second day just to maintain his profile. He, and the rest of his DFAT staff, definitely work very hard to maintain, develop and enhance the political culture of the region in order to ensure the reconstruction of Iraq progressed as planned.

Iraq, especially Baghdad, is a constantly changing environment and, in terms of security, changes (I won't say evolves) every few weeks. Commanders need to be extremely flexible and adaptive with your plans. What may be the 'norm' at the present time, will inevitably change within a matter of weeks. CPP cannot be run by stringent doctrine, nor should it expect to be - as with any other military capability. SOPs and TTPs need to be constantly updated and reviewed IOT ensure the team can provide the best level of CPP they can. Drops in performance levels or the development of an unwillingness to enhance the capability you provide, depletes the image of professionalism and the maintenance of your commanders COG - your hard target posture. The image you display and the target you and your team displays has a direct affect on how others view the image and status of the Ambassador; once you start to break these down, the enemy will prey on

your vulnerabilities as you are now seen as a soft target. We saw this during our deployment when the Polish Ambassador's convoy was hit by a complex ambush and this, more than any other incident, reinforced the need to maintain standards of professionalism and to remain as flexible and adaptive as possible. Commanders need to have the conviction to make decisions that provide best protection for the Principal and his soldiers; more-so, individuals need to have the confidence and the maturity to make important decisions based purely off a commander's intent. Pre-deployment training, as a matter of priority, should focus on the development of these skills in the junior members of the team.

On to other matters now, it wasn't long before the weather started to change as well. All of a sudden we dropped down to 20 degrees (which for the Darwin and Townsville people proved a dramatic shock to their system). Each day after that it seemed to drop about a degree which actually made it a lot easier to do our job. The weather became a lot more enjoyable, and our self confessed "geardo's" (myself included) revelled in the opportunity to purchase (procure through the system of course) more shiny kit. WO2 Pieschel had a separate Q-Store not before too long, and the rest of the CT actually preferred to go



Meetings in open spaces still require vigilance



through him than our own Q Staff, especially when it came to knives... (Anyone that knows Shelly knows that this is not an uncommon practise and is, at times, somewhat disturbing).

During our deployment the team was also required to support movements of key DFAT staff around Iraq to such places as Sulaymaniyah, Kirkuk, Erbil, Tallil and Basra just to name a few. The team learnt some valuable lessons from these visits which helped to enhance and develop our own TTP's when operating back down in Baghdad. The junior members of the team assisted with the development of new OUR's and TTP's for the team, which again enhanced the capability and operability of the team on a daily basis.

Overall, the individuals on the team maintained a very high level of morale and work tempo throughout the deployment. Of note, CPL Eadie was promoted to SGT not long after deployment, expedited due to the position he was holding within the team, and more-so after the effort he and SGT Saintsbury put in to the redevelopment and enhancement of RST.

The two female searchers that came on the trip with us, CPL Phillips and LCPL Shankster, also put in commendable efforts, and put in some very long hours with the Infantry platoons to ensure they were up to scratch when assigned to Embassy security. Their vigilance was noted by all and, proved to be one of the major comforting factors for DFAT staff around the Embassy. Fortunately, they were awarded an OC's Commendation at the conclusion of the deployment for their tireless efforts.

CPL's Morrison and McPhee were lucky enough to be promoted by the CA during his visit in the new year, something that both members won't forget for some time to come. However, it should be noted that SGT McPhee is required to carry a towel with him at all times – especially if he feels as if he may get nervous (I will leave the CPL/SGT rumour network to disseminate that chestnut).

Christmas came and all got very excited. I am sure that SGT Saintsbury's family had to dedicate a whole FEDEX 474 jumbo jet to get the amount of parcels he got; I think at last count he received 24 parcels. One of the Suss runs out to the BIAP and back for stores was actually dedicated to bringing all his stuff into SECDET (note: this is a true story). That night the cooks put on a great feed and we got our allocated two beers which were well deserved. Most thought



## Just another day at the office

that the two beers would not be enough to make the night enjoyable however, the ensuing game of Monopoly proved those members wrong. For future reference, CPL Hagan should never be allowed near a game of Monopoly ever again however, if he is to partake in said game, he is to be informed of EVERY move ALL players make. In addition, it is recommended that any properties that he obtains should be glued to his forehead for ease of reference.

SGT Morrison was fortunate enough to be asked to be the CJTF 633's BG during WO2 Payne's ROCL period. Whilst this put a bit of a burden on the CPPT, the experience and opportunity for the member was fantastic. During his tenure, he assisted the J3 and J1 Cell with the development of upcoming VIP visits and intimate knowledge on the conduct of SECDET operations. This experience put Damian in a great position for any future deployments in a combined service arena.

Before long the SECDET XIII MP CPPT had arrived on our doorstep, chomping at the bit to get started, which reminded me of the way we were about six months prior. For most of us it was good to see them arrive, and reinforced the fact that we were to be heading home very soon.

Quickly, the guys grabbed the last minute 'war trophies' and paraphernalia to send home to their families to keep as mementos. Some of the guys even came back with more bags than they went over with which was interesting to note and what's more, seemed very concerned as to whether or not certain 'items' would make it through Customs. I'm not saying that any money changed hands

when their bags were getting inspected, but the guys that had been over before seemed well versed with what could and could not be brought back into Australia...

To conclude, all members of the team put in a sterling effort through the deployment. All that interacted with them were impressed with their efforts and made comment on their attitude, rapport and professionalism they displayed on a daily basis. For their efforts, the Team was awarded the Commander Joint Task Force 633 Bronze Group Commendation. Everyone thoroughly enjoyed their deployment and, I'm sure, are more than happy to stick their hand up should another opportunity arise in the future.



**Author: CAPT Nathan Pierpoint accepted into ADFA in 1999 and graduated from RMC in 2002 being corps allocated to RACMP. He undertook regimental training with 3 RAR in 2003 and was posted to HQ 1 MP Bn in 2004. He was posted to 11 PI and 3 MP Coy between 2004 and 2006 and is currently the OPSO at Charlie Coy 1 MP Bn.**



## ECN 315 MILITARY POLICEMAN TRADE TRANSFER OPPORTUNITY



The Military Policeman in the Army assists Military Police Commanders in providing command and control support to the senior military commander, and assists the Provost Marshal - Army by providing policing support to the wider Defence community. A Military Policeman can expect to be involved in policing tasks in a variety of situations in both the field and barracks environments. The Military Policeman must be able to operate independently, make ethical decisions based on available information, be flexible in their approach to problem solving and communicate effectively with soldiers, their commanders and members of the public.

Some of the tasks that Military Policemen undertake include, investigations, liaison with other policing agencies, traffic regulation, policing duties, close personal protection for VIP, assistance with physical security and handling enemy prisoners of war. In addition to working as a General Duties Military Policeman a soldier in the RACMP can choose to specialise as an Investigator, a Military Police Dog Handler or a Close Personal Protection Operator.

### Education Requirements

Completion of Australian Year 10 education (or equivalent) with passes in English and Mathematics

### Pay Grade

After completing initial training a qualified Military Policeman is on Pay Group 3. After successful completion of the probationary period and the Service Police Investigator Course, a Military Policeman is on Pay Group 4

### Employment Training

It is desirable that intending applicants hold a military driver licence prior to applying for transfer to RACMP. Initial corps training is then undertaken at the Defence Police Training Centre (DPTC) at Holsworthy, NSW over a 11-week period. This is followed by 12-month On the Job Experience.

**Military Policemen are encouraged to specialise by undertaking further military and trade courses as well as tertiary studies during their initial engagement.**

Other training and courses include:

- Close Personal Protection - Trains specialist military police to act as the Army's body guards.
- Guard Security (Military Police Dog Handling) - Trains selected military police in all aspects of military police dogs, including how to track offenders and enemy saboteurs.
- Detention Centre Supervisor (All Corps) - Trains service personnel in the requirements needed to operate a detention facility.
- ADF Investigators Course - Trains military police in the advanced skills of investigations to then be employed in the ADF Investigation Service (ADFIS).

### Course Dates

16 Feb – 7 May 2009

6 Apr – 26 Jun 2009



**Enquiries:** [army.tradetransferteam@defence.gov.au](mailto:army.tradetransferteam@defence.gov.au)

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**Or Internet:** <http://www.defence.gov.au/army/STAYARMY/RACMP.htm> for more information



# LEST WE FORGET – Man's best friend

By CAPT Andrew Deacon, Commander Dog Platoon, D Coy 1 MP Bn



The Military Police Dog (MPD) PI based at the Army Aviation Centre, Oakey has a proud history of providing the MPD capability to Army. Their service includes serving on a number of operations including OP Gold, OP Tanager, OP Citadel, OP Anode and OP Astute. Since the units raising four MPD have made the ultimate sacrifice whilst serving on operations.



1658 MWD Zac was born on 01 Apr 1994 and was a German Shepherd. He attended the RAAF MWD course at the RAAF Security and Fire School and was teamed with CPL Bowes. MWD Zac deployed on OP Tanager in Apr 2002 and served there until his death on 11 July 2002. MWD Zac was buried in Timor Leste and a small memorial was erected in his memory.



1632 MPD Littleman was born in Sep 1996 and was enlisted into the RAAF on 22 Jun 1999. He was allocated to RAAF handler CPL Barnes on 19 Jul 1999 to conduct the RAAF MWD course later that year. MPD Littleman transferred to the Army and was reteamd with MPDH CPL Bowes on 11 Dec 2002. He served with CPL Bowes on OP Anode from Jul-Nov 2003 and continued to serve with him until he was reallocated to SGT Wilkinson in Jan 2007. He deployed on OP Astute with SGT Wilkinson in Mar 2007 and served there until his death in May 2007. He was cremated and interned at Camp Phoenix, Timor Leste where a plaque and memorial now stand.



1686 MPD Hudson was born on 01 Sep 1999 and was allocated to CPL Hodges on 13 March 2001 to attend the RAAF MWD course. He served with CPL Hodges and deployed on OP Citadel in Oct 2002 until Apr 2003. He continued to serve with CPL Hodges until Jan 2005 when he was reallocated to pool dog duties. In Jan 2007 he was reteamd with CPL Polita and deployed to Timor Leste on OP Astute in March 2007. He served there until his death in May 2007. He was cremated and interned at Camp Phoenix, Timor Leste.



MPD463, MPD Ziggy was born in Jan 2003 and was initially enlisted in the RAAF where he conducted pre-course training. He transferred to the Army in Jan 2007 and was allocated to CPL Dean Jennings on 06 Jun 2007. He completed the MPDH course with CPL Jennings and was posted to the MPD PI Oakey on 24 Aug 2007. He served at the MPD PI until 01 Apr 08 when he deployed on OP Astute with TLBG 5. He served on OP Astute until his death on 24 Aug 2008. He was cremated and Australian Army Chaplain John Sanderson with the assistance of New Zealand Army Chaplain Hylton Froggatt conducted a simple memorial service for MPD Ziggy and he was interned at Camp Phoenix, Timor Leste.

MPD and their handlers continue to serve with distinction with four MPD currently supporting OP Astute. Whilst we often focus on the human cost of operations we must never forget the ultimate sacrifice made by man's best friend.

Lest we forget.





# HONOURS AND AWARDS 2008

## QUEENS BIRTHDAY HONOURS 2008

### Medal of the Order of Australia

*Warrant Officer Class One K. Bullman, HQ 1 MP Bn  
(2006-2007)*

### Chief of Army Commendation Single Service Commendation (Gold)

*Major I. Stewart, HQ 1 MP Bn*

### Single Service Commendation (Bronze)

*Corporal K. Rudge, B Coy 1 MP Bn*

### Operation Astute Commander Joint Task Force 631 Commendation

*Sergeant M.A. Holland, HQ 1 MP Bn*

### Commander Joint Task Force 631 Group Commendation (TLBG 4)

*Sergeant D. Hedberg, D Coy 1 MP Bn*

*Corporal J. Gibb, D Coy 1 MP Bn*

*Corporal D. Wells, D Coy 1 MP Bn*

*Corporal D. Jennings, D Coy 1 MP Bn*

### Operation Resolute Commander Border Protection Command Commendation (Bronze)

*Corporal M. Smallman, B Coy 1 MP Bn*

### Operation Catalyst Commander Joint Task Force 633 Bronze Group Commendation (SECDet XII)

*Captain N. Pierpoint, C Coy 1 MP Bn*

*Warrant Officer Class Two B. Pieschel, B Coy 1 MP Bn*

*Sergeant P. Saintsbury, B Coy 1 MP Bn*

*Sergeant R. Eadie, B Coy 1 MP Bn*

*Sergeant D. Morrison, A Coy 1 MP Bn*

*Sergeant H. McPhee, DPTC*

*Corporal L. Whelan, A Coy 1 MP Bn*

*Corporal S. Hagan, D Coy 1 MP Bn*

*Corporal C. Rogan, D Coy 1 MP Bn*

*Corporal J. Smith, DPTC*

### Commander Joint Task Force 633 Silver Commendation (SECDet XI)

*Sergeant G. Wilson, A Coy 1 MP Bn*

### Commander Joint Task Force 633 Bronze Commendation (SECDet XIII)

*Warrant Officer Class Two J. Pratt, B Coy 1 MP Bn*

### Peter Boyle Memorial Trophy - 2008

*Corporal S. Griffiths, B Coy 1 MP Bn*

### Bob Jeppesen Trophy - 2008

*Corporal J. Pietzner, DPTC*

### Soldiers Medallion

*Corporal G. Connolly, DPTC*

*Corporal J. McBeth, D Coy 1 MP Bn*

*Corporal A. Phelps, B Coy 1 MP Bn*

*Corporal R. Pittman, HQ 1 MP Bn*

*Lance Corporal L. Watts, C Coy 1 MP Bn*

### RACMP Prize for the RMC Graduate

*Lieutenant Alexander Knox, B Coy 1 MP Bn*



# RACMP PROMOTIONS – 2008

LTCOL		MAJ		CAPT	
Darren Anstee Nick Surtees Gary Vale		Scott Foster Andrew Jordan Darren Krajewski Amanda Meech Dale Morley		Katrina Adie Sean Collopy Kari Davies Andrew Deacon Tiffany Douglas Ben Respondek Jason Urquhart	
LT		WO1		WO2	
Kaan Finney David Ford Alexander Knox Adrian John Longmuir Michael Allan Rhodes		Andrija Rojcevic Tommie Tsakrios Patrick Luke Trusselle Bryce Turner Timothy Wilson		Graeme Callaghan Glenn Forrest Naomi Freeman Robert Friend Michael Pimm Kenneth Scanlon	
David Donovan Ian Hildred Martin Hurnen Troy Jewell Ian MacMinn Christopher Whitworth Leonard Zornig					
SGT		CPL		LCPL	
Neville Bridges Christopher Buckham Antony Buckingham Scott Bryant Glen Chamberlain Rowan Eadie Daniel Gray Steven Giuliani Che Hartley Anthony Hagerty Dean Hedberg Lachlan Hutcherson Russell Iliff Ewald Isaak Christopher Keyes Leonard Lewis Jeffrey Lyon Scott McDougall Heath Mcphee		Andrew Roberts Guy Wilson Jason Wilson Stephen Wood		Glen Arnott Shane Pieschel Sheridan Bonney Timothy Power Jack Bruncker Reginald Ramage John Burnside Mark Russell Graham Bryan Kate Ryan Julian Carey Ceri-Anne Shankster Gavin Cook Michael Smallman Clyde Currie Ryan Sulcas Tauraa Exham Nathan Wood Stephane Fricotte Ashley Yewsang Adam Gardiner	
Jeremiah Gibb Matthew Gilles Luke Gorringer Vince Grillo Naomi James Robert Jamieson Jason Jesser Louise Kramer Benjamin Liston Shane Mair John McBeth Samuel Montignie Alan Napier Sunil Nazareth Shawn Phillips William Young		Derek Csorba Katarzyna Czyrek Arran Dickson Anthony Flack Ashley Faulks Jason Grant Nathan Hobbs Charles Hutchins Andira Kauer Adam Mulder Brent Nichols Jason Peterson Christopher Phillips John Ryan Luke Skipper Krystlee Smith Samuel Tate Anthony Thomas Steven Tsakisiris Hannah Tunsted Sean Wynne William Young			



# AN UPDATE ON ARMY PROJECTS

Throughout 2008, OPM-A has been progressing several projects which have been on going, sometimes for several years. Although most of these projects have not been concluded, they are progressing slowly through the system and hopefully have been established for success in the future.

The main focus of OPM-A throughout 2008 has been the establishment of the Domestic Policing Unit (DPU) which will be an AHQ unit, commanded by PM-A. It is anticipated that the DPU will commence operations in January 2009, rolling out in 15 locations across Australia over the next five years. The locations which will be established, in date order, are DPU HQ – Canberra, Singleton, Kapooka, Canberra, Bandiana, Puckapunyal (all 2009), Darwin, Townsville, Brisbane (all 2010), Holsworthy, Edinburgh (both 2011), Randwick and Watsonia (both 2012). Manning within the DPU will continue to increase, with an ultimate anticipated Posted Strength of 78.

The DPU will conduct all Garrison Policing and Minor Criminal Investigations (MCI) within Army. As the DPU increases, the burden of these duties will be removed from 1 MP Bn and ADFIS, allowing them to concentrate on operations and serious/sensitive investigations respectively. The DPU will see the reintroduction of a focus on traditional policing roles, raising the profile of RACMP across many barracks within Australia. DPU will work closely with ADFIS to ensure mutual support, a close mentoring program to ensure MCI skills are developed and enhanced, and ultimately provide a solid recruiting pool for ADFIS of Military Policemen who have shown the skills, motivation and aptitude for the conduct of investigations.

The DPU will offer the General Duties policeman, with diverse backgrounds, the opportunity for employment outside specialist streams or a respite from a high tempo, operational environment. Further, with the dispersed locations, the DPU offers the opportunity for posting to locations with previous restrictions of availability, a challenge to commanders to operate independently, and the ability to reconfirm

policing skills. The DPU introduces another avenue for Military Policemen across Australia, and will hopefully prove to be a challenging and rewarding posting.

In addition to the DPU, the OPM-A has been working on several other projects. For many years, numerous RACMP organisations have been working on the updating of the Service Police Speed Measuring Device. This has continued through 2008 by OPM-A. Unfortunately funding and prioritisation of the project by organisations external to RACMP continues to be an issue, which has seen the project held up as different options are explored. AHQ continues to support OPM-A with the processing of the project to DMO. With the introduction and expansion of the DPU, it is anticipated that the new focus on Garrison Policing will assist in providing the justification and clearly highlight the deficiencies with the FALCON Speed Detection device. Additionally, some excellent work has been conducted at local level, to commence local liaison, and obtain Civilian Police support, training and experience with updated Speed Measuring Devices. OPM-A intends to continue these relationships and enhance them to the betterment of RACMP.

With the introduction of the DPU, OPM-A remains focused on improving on techniques and equipment currently available to MPs and further develop new avenues or acquire new equipment. The introduction of the new Military Police Troop Carrier will greatly enhance the ability of MPs to conduct Garrison Policing, including transporting and detaining POIs. The vehicle displays the professional standards that all MPs have, and all other equipment should reflect the same. Some shortfalls have been identified with sedan and station wagons currently used by the MPs for Garrison Policing. Some remain completely unmarked, even though they are used in an overt role. Others have outdated, broken or otherwise ineffective lights and sirens, which currently do not get replaced, fixed or updated. OPM-A have formally processed requests for AHQ support to be provided to DMO, to ensure all MP lights, sirens and markings are required to be updated and maintained when required, or

on replacement of the vehicle, at Army expense. This project is in its infancy and is progressing.

In addition, OPM-A continues to explore new methods of operation in use within State Police. OPM-A is currently scoping the use of Digital Recording Devices, to be used whilst on the road or desk duties, conducting Garrison Policing. It is reported that many Queensland Police Officers utilise Digital Voice Recorders to record field interviews, which have been produced in court with no dispute over the discrete voice recordings. OPM-A continues to scope the introduction of Digital Voice Recorders, to ensure that if recorders are introduced, the items purchased meet Garrison Police requirements and ensure any potential legal complications are resolved before they are introduced.

In conjunction with the introduction of the DPU, OPM-A is currently in the process of liaising with each State Police Commissioner, providing update on the DPU and the implications on State Police. It is expected that the DPU will further enhance the Civilian Police/MP relationship which have been maintained at local level over the past few years. MPs continue to provide an extremely useful service to local Civilian Police, and are often requested to provide intimate support, especially in rural areas. Issues such as the carriage of Civilian Police radios are to be raised as a priority at the highest level. Communication with the Civilian Police radio nets is seen as a high safety priority for OPM-A, as it ensures that MPs can immediately respond to any relevant call, additionally civilian police can respond to any calls for assistance from the MPs, which would otherwise be isolated or available on mobile phone contact only.

The OPM-A continues to focus on projects that will continue to enhance all aspects of RACMP. It is anticipated that all projects will progress throughout the year, and hopefully the outcomes will be seen in 2009. PM-A openly encourages any suggestions or feedback on the current projects, or suggestions for projects or areas for improvement in the future.





# Adaptive Army and impacts on RACMP

**by Major Damian Hick**

MAJ Damian Hick is current SO2 Regional/Domestic Operations Army, within the Directorate of Operations, AHQ. His previous positions include OC 4 MP Company, SI MP School, Deputy Provost Marshal 1st Division and PLCOMD 41 MP Pl. He has deployed to East Timor with INTERFET and Iraq as part of the Iraq Survey Group.

You should have all read the Chief of Army's email recently that was sent to over 37,000 Army uniformed and civilian personnel explaining the upcoming changes within Army over the next few years as a result of Adaptive Army. I hope that many of you followed the links to the presentation on the DRN – if not I hope this prompts you to, as the changes are going to happen! It is important that RACMP understand this new environment, identify where it fits and seek out the surfaces and gaps in order to place itself in the best position for the future.

Adaptive Army will see the biggest change in Army higher level structures since the 1970's Hasset Review, upon which the current structure is based. Now that HQJOC is the focal C2 construct for operations, the single services primary focus has become the generation and preparation of forces for operations. We have known this for some time but our structures and missions do not match – for example our current mission "To win the Land Battle" does not accurately reflect Army's role as a force provider, unless assigned to CJOPs as part of a JTF.

In terms of adaptability, don't let this fool you into thinking this is a 'poor man's' approach to conducting operations – as I hear a few rumblings from



## RACMP Corps Fund

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The RACMP Corps Fund is set up to generate funds to support RACMP activities and members. These activities include presentations, trophies, historical memorabilia, Corps functions, etc. If you would like more information on how you could make a donation please contact the Editor on (02) 6266 6536 or email [michael.pemberton@defence.gov.au](mailto:michael.pemberton@defence.gov.au)



within. In fact it is the very opposite. Adaptability means a great deal in this context and it is imperative that the environment that we operate within must be understood. Let's face it, we will never be a large Army; we will never have a large budget and most likely always be part of a coalition. Add to this what I believe is the most important – although far from new – paradigm development for our Army – counterinsurgency, otherwise known as COIN. Its continually changing environment across the military and non-military spectrum is ripe for adaptability and quick decision cycles.

To operate within any hostile conventional/non-conventional environment requires the ability for a military to become adaptive to that respective environment – to allow a commander to change force composition to meet the changing environment, through to the government requiring different effects in line with the developing campaign. If we continue to operate in the rigid structures of the past, we would simply just rotate Brigades for the next 10-15 years with little change to what effects we deliver, thus limiting how we successfully develop/shape a campaign. With an adaptable process each Task Force would be constructed of elements of capability, based on effects required at that point of the campaign. A recent example of this is the adaptability of the Reconstruction Task Force (RTF) into the Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force (MRTF) for Afghanistan.

As further development occurs as to how we campaign and integrate a Whole of Govt strategy, Army has acknowledged this new paradigm and has realigned how we prepare and sustain our capability for assignment to operations, both from an individual and collective training perspective. Army has also flattened the C2 construct within by minimising Headquarters in line with the Mission Command Philosophy. Essentially this is how the Adaptive Army was born.

So what does this all mean for RACMP, especially 1 MP BN? I sense great opportunity here, with some persistence required. Under the current plan, you will note that 1 MP Bn has been allocated within 17 Bde, Forces Command. It is important that this is not seen as a hard and fast decision at this stage, with opportunity to develop where we fit. The Corps Executive must analyse what 'policing effects' actually equate to in an operational context and more importantly, where RACMP needs to focus in the future. For example, I would strongly argue that 1

MP Bn would be better suited to fall within the ISTAR command over the CSS command. In an operational environment, Police are able to provide feeds of immense credibility into the intelligence cycle (through CRIMINT based on evidence); targeting of Persons of Interest (POI) through analysis, and the subsequent detainment/arrest of those POI for security or investigative purposes, based on that analysis. Detention should be viewed the same way as Battlefield Circulation Control (BCC) and other security tasks feed the same process. Forget traffic control as simply directing traffic – see it as feeding the force protection and intelligence cycle, particularly within COIN.

Which command 1 MP Bn identifies with will be absolutely critical in terms of how your support is viewed within the future, both within Army and the HQJOC planning cycle. CO 1 MP Bn and the other executive members will need to proactively socialise this C2 relationship over the next few months in order to cement a position for the Bn. The questions that require immediate examination are:

- Operationally, what does 'military policing' actually mean, when compared with policing?
- What effects do we generate in the battlespace now?
- How does the broader operational environment, viewed by Army fit, with RACMP future concepts?
- What are our allies doing?
- What effects should we be generating in the battlespace?
- How do we contribute to the Campaign, through the delivery of an effect? (Eg, Can we legitimately produce a Military and Non-military effect within a COIN context under LOAC?)
- How does this influence the Intelligence and Force Protection effects?

Once the C2 linkage is cemented, RACMP must maintain links into two other key structures: HQ 1 Div (as they will be OPCON HQJOC for operational planning) and HQJOC. The HQ 1 Div link will be critical in terms of representing Army's planning process into HQJOC, impacting significantly on the construction of the Operational Manning and Equipment Document (OMED). Possible options are a Provost Marshal; a strong 1 MP BN tie, through representation or a non-corps position such as a Plans branch position – latter most preferable perhaps.

For HQJOC, the RACMP rep should be an officer preferably at Major rank (ideally psc) that understands planning and operations; unfortunately, considering a Warrant Officer or junior Officer will not deliver the desired effects. Is the Corps likely to achieve a Provost Marshal position in HQJOC? Although ideal, it is perhaps unlikely. It will be difficult to achieve, but the most realistic option is to have a position identified for non-corps allocation, within operations or plans branch. This will allow the officer to represent the Corps as required at the critical stages of the planning cycle. In order to assist the officer, I have commented in the past that COAC is essential for the officers understanding and credibility over and above the RACMP ROAC, as this latter course does little to develop the officer in the Arms Corp space, which Army essentially operates within. Given my own short comings in this space, I would reinforce COAC as a must.

What can RACMP do to prepare now? Addressing the questions above would be a good start as they will provide a good foundation. Once these are developed, Mission Essential Tasks Lists (METLs) need to be revised and updated – in the late 90's we developed a swag of these. Forces Command will be responsible for the development of these and as such it is important that RACMP be proactively involved. METLs would contain all policing and soldier skill sets required by our personnel to conduct operations. Considering how operations, in a hostile environment, changes the very nature of policing and how simple tasks become quite difficult, may result in an adaption of how we achieve an outcome – i.e. something as simple as gathering of evidence within minimum time on target. Whilst we may follow all the required procedures at home IAW the rules of evidence, we may have to adapt to what are essential requirements and desired requirements, which will satisfy a court in a hostile zone and feed the intelligence cycle.

The Corps Executive should study the Adaptive Army changes and MAP an approach forward on behalf of the corps, engaging the relevant stakeholders. Adaptive Army is the future and one that will bring great benefit if we jump on for the ride, be proactive and identify the surfaces and gaps.



# THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF MILITARY POLICE

By LTCOL Nick Surtees

RACMP has undergone significant change in the past 15 years. In the mid 1990's RACMP suffered heavily under the auspice of the Defence Efficiency Review and the subsequent Defence Reform Program, essentially our Garrison Policing function was substantially reduced. Since late 1999, RACMP has made significant contributions to operational commitments and continues to do so. The establishment of the 1st Military Police Battalion is perhaps one of the more significant events in our contemporary history. More recently it appears that our Corps may be allocated additional resources from Army Headquarters to re-establish the Garrison

Policing function on a permanent basis. From a whole of Army perspective, the Adaptive Army initiative represents the most significant organisational development since the early 1970s—these arrangements will certainly impact on RACMP in one way or another.

With so much going on, it begs the question: are our strategic management foundations strong enough? It is not my intention to engage in discussion relating to any specific strategic direction or capability, rather the following discussion is aimed at the 'corporate governance' of Military Police, not an exciting topic on face value but it's a topic that affects us all. The following discussion will identify the Corps current corporate governance arrangements and will recommend some changes to ensure

the Corps is better placed to manage the myriad of pressures that are either upon us now or are clearly visible on the horizon.

## What is corporate governance?

It's a phrase I've heard many times in Defence. I'm not convinced it's properly understood so I'll begin with a brief definition. Australian Standard AS8000-2003: Good Governance Principles defines corporate governance as 'a system by which entities are directed and controlled.' In Defence two of the principle apparatus for exercising corporate governance are charters/directives to key personnel and the committee system. Specifically, there is a Ministerial Directive to the Secretary and Chief of Defence Force (SEC/CDF) and there are charters (also known as Organisation Performance Reports)





between the SEC/CDF and each Service Chief/Group Head. The charters outline the Service Chiefs/Group Heads deliverables, guides the development of the Group or Service Business Plan and forms the basis for reporting to the Secretary and CDF on Defence priorities. In terms of committees, there are quite a few in Defence, each with its own unique purpose and membership. The committees are generally advisory in nature with the chair exercising executive authority. This apparatus provides Army's senior staff with the opportunity to make informed decisions which results in clear and cohesive strategic direction. In terms of the corporate governance of a Corps, all have a Head of Corps (HOC). For larger Corps this is generally a very senior officer, for example the HOC RAAOC is MAJGEN Cosson. With such a senior officer at the helm, you'd expect clear and unambiguous leadership. Smaller Corps, such as ours, on the other hand don't have the same luxury. The RACMP HOC (currently PM-A) is the same rank as other key RACMP appointments and from time to time may even be a more junior officer (in terms of experience and time in rank); therefore the question of Corps leadership through the HOC function for small Corps might not be sufficiently adequate.

In terms of RACMP specific corporate governance we have the three senior appointments (HOC/PM-A, CO 1 MP Bn and COMDT DPTC) and the Corps Executive Committee (CEC). The CEC is a great step in the right direction to ensure our strategic direction is clear and cohesive. That said, the CEC is not a formally recognised institution outside the Corps nor do any of our senior appointments have a charter imposed by a higher authority. Essentially, the CEC relies on the cooperation and good will of its current membership; which has generally been forthcoming on all issues. The CEC has agreed on its own terms of reference which identifies the PM-A as the chair and the COL COMDT, CO 1 MP Bn, COMDT DPTC, Corps RSM and RSM 1 MP Bn as members. In this forum the chair does not have any more or less power than the other members. The CEC does invite participation from others as required (eg subject matter experts, ADFIS etc). Of significance is that the current arrangements do not provide the PM-A with the necessary formal arrangements to take full responsibility for the overall strategic direction of the Corps.

While the initial establishment of the CEC was a positive and commendable step,

it is now time for the Corps to take the next step by seeking to have a charter issued to the PM-A which also recognises the existence of the CEC. Primarily the main theme of the charter should be to charge the PM-A with the lead responsibility for identifying and managing the strategic direction of RACMP and that the CEC, of which the PM-A is the chair, should be used as the principle forum for identifying and maintaining the strategic direction. The charter should address such matters as: accountability, stewardship and leadership. In terms of accountability the charter should require the PM-A to report to a senior Army committee (either the Chief of Army Senior Advisory Committee or the Army Capability Management Committee) at least once, if not twice a year to report on progress and to seek strategic direction as necessary. In terms of stewardship the charter should impress upon the PM-A and the other CEC members the need to make continuous improvement to the organisation that they are entrusted to care. In terms of leadership the charter should identify the responsibility that each member has to the CEC, it should clearly articulate that the CEC is an advisory committee and that the chair exercises executive authority. If this suggestion were accepted, the first step in securing the establishment of these arrangements could be via a brief from the PM-A to the Chief of Army recommending the imposition of a charter on the PM-A. In anticipation of this suggestion being progressed, the author is currently preparing a draft charter for presentation to the CEC.

In the foreseeable future, RACMP is likely to have the opportunity to engage in a number of initiatives aimed at addressing the strategic direction of our Corps. Examples of these initiatives include an Army Capability Requirement and a Force Structure Review. Moreover, our Corps will be impacted upon, along with all elements of Army, by the Adaptive Army initiative recently announced by the Chief of Army. In order for the Corps to respond to these challenges in a cohesive manner, it would benefit greatly from the release of a charter to the PM-A (noting the dual responsibility of PM-A and HOC). Perhaps the first task for the PM-A would be to produce a strategic plan for the Corps which brings all of these initiatives together. There is no doubt this is a challenging task, as evidenced, in my opinion, by previous unsuccessful attempts. Such a product might then set the foundations for subordinate and

well synchronised plans including garrison policing, combat capability and individual training.

I'm not suggesting that the current arrangements, if left in place, will result in catastrophic failure. My view is that in light of our evolution in the past decade together with the challenges of the next decade, we would be better placed to confront future challenges if our corporate governance arrangements were strengthened. Nothing in this paper is aimed at reducing the command responsibilities of the CO 1 MP Bn or COMDT DPTC. In the end, the incumbents to these significant appointments would remain answerable and responsive to their own chains of command. Rather than limit the responsibilities of CO 1 MP Bn and COMDT DPTC these arrangements would benefit them by allowing them to focus on their command responsibilities while the PM-A is able to focus on the whole of Corps strategic direction.

Our previous and current leadership groups should be commended for their efforts to get the Corps into the strong position it enjoys today. The Corps now has the opportunity to capitalise on this strong position by further strengthening its corporate governance. A stronger corporate governance frame work will ensure strategic consistency within the Corps and will assist greatly in engaging and securing outcomes from Army's corporate governance apparatus. Accordingly, I believe that the formal imposition of a charter on the HOC/PM-A, which recognises the establishment of the CEC, as critical to our future success. It's an exciting time for the Corps, we are well placed to ensure the Australian Army has the best possible Military Policing capability—that said, there is always more we can do.

**Author:** LTCOL Surtees is currently serving as the Staff Officer Grade One—Workforce Plans in AHQ (DGPERS-A). LTCOL Surtees joined RACMP in 1992. Since that time he has held a number of MP appointments including: PLCOMD 12 MP Pl and 16 MP Pl, OPSO 3 MP Coy and OC 1 MP Coy.



# The Role of the Military Police in Enhancing ADF-AFP Interoperability on Peace and Stability Operations

**Captain Damian Eaton ADJT 1 MP Bn**

## Introduction

The evolution of modern peace and stability operations has resulted in an increasing blend of military and police action within a complex environment shaped by humanitarian and diplomatic activity. As the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and Australian Federal Police (AFP) seek to complement their respective lines of operation, the versatility and suitability of the Military Police (MP) in enhancing ADF-AFP interoperability has not been fully recognised. Recent interoperability initiatives implemented by both the ADF and AFP have involved limited participation or contribution by the MP despite its proven history of operational and training cooperation with civilian police (CIVPOL).

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the fundamental role of the MP in enhancing ADF-AFP interoperability on peace and stability operations. This will be achieved by highlighting the evolution of complex peace and stability operations and the development of complementary ADF-AFP operations; illustrating the specialist support MP provide to the restoration of law and order on peace and stability operations through its commonality with CIVPOL; and finally, outlining the development of the AFP International Deployment Group (IDG) and the contribution of MP to ADF-AFP interoperability initiatives.

## Evolution of Complex Peace and Stability Operations


The changing nature of peace and stability operations, from the traditional disengagement and separation of forces (Cambodia 1991) to complex intrastate multi-dimensional operations (Timor Leste 2006), has resulted in greater interaction between the ADF and key law-enforcement, humani-

tarian and diplomatic components. During an address to the International Peace Operations Seminar in 2007, MAJGEN Michael Smith (rtd) outlined several military lessons learnt from the ADF's involvement in modern complex peace and stability operations characterised by a concentration of 'grey' areas in which military, humanitarian and other agencies overlap. MAJGEN Smith, a former Deputy Force Commander of INTERFET, illustrated the evolution of peace and stability operations, and emergence of the 'thin blue line' that exists between the role of military and law-enforcement, by identifying the need for more Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and constabulary capabilities, and improved police-military cooperation within the ADF.

Current operations in Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands highlight the blend of military-led 'low-end warfighting' and

police-led 'high-end policing' operations, as part of a Whole-of-Government response, within a 'humanitarian space' filled with a significant number of diverse organisations and components (Figure 1-1). The Humanitarian Office of the European Commission (ECHO) defines humanitarian space as 'the access and freedom for humanitarian organisations to assess and meet humanitarian needs'<sup>1</sup>.

The concept of humanitarian space seeks to replace the conventional notion of a 'battlespace' as the complex physical, human and informational terrain of modern peace and stability operations is often engulfed by a humanitarian disaster that is perpetuated by the collapse of indigenous Government, law-enforcement, security, judicial and administrative frameworks. This presents a unique challenge for the ADF as it is now required to adopt the role of humanitarian,



**Figure 1-1: The Blend of Military and Police Operations within the Humanitarian Space of Complex Peace and Stability Operations**

<sup>1</sup> International Peace Operations Seminar 2007, NGO Considerations and Approaches to Peace Operations



peacekeeper and warfighter ‘all in the same day, all within three city blocks’.<sup>2</sup>

## Complementary ADF-AFP Operations

Recent peace and stability operations in Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands have involved the deployment of a large number of CIVPOL, including the AFP, in response to internal conflicts in which the rule of law and legal system is either weak or has collapsed. The ADF considers international CIVPOL as ‘the key secondary partner in peace operations’<sup>3</sup> and has identified the need for a civilian ‘police presence ... alongside a military presence, directly helping communities to establish a stable

environment’.<sup>4</sup> Table 1-1 illustrates the complementary nature of the AFP operations continuum as part of Peace and Stability Operations, and the ADF’s five interdependent and mutually reinforcing lines of operation as part of Adaptive Campaigning.

As outlined in the AFP submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade *Inquiry into Australia’s Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations*, the AFP recognises that the exit and entry points of all international participants in a peace and stability operation ‘will be determined by levels of security and the capabilities of the emerging or reshaped state’.<sup>5</sup> Additionally, the primacy of response

and operational leadership will rapidly shift as stability and security is established.

The high level of threat generally associated with the upsurge of intrastate conflict may require the conduct of *Joint Land Combat* operations by the ADF, albeit low-level, in order to remove belligerent parties and establish a secure environment that will facilitate the conduct of subsequent lines of operations by military and police components. The complex human terrain of contemporary peace and stability operations will often necessitate the conduct of *Population Protection* operations by the military in a ‘complex chaotic battlespace where so often the essence of it is the establishment or re-establishment of the rule of

AFP Operations Continuum (Peace and Stability Operations)	ADF Lines of Operations (Adaptive Campaigning)
<p><b>Peace Building</b> (Preventative Diplomacy) – includes action to prevent disputes from developing between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict and to limit the expansion of conflicts when they occur.</p>	<p>Limited / No capacity</p>
<p>Limited / No capacity</p>	<p><b>Joint Land Combat</b> – includes actions to secure the environment, remove organised resistance and set conditions for the other lines of operations. May include close combat under contemporary conditions in complex and particularly urban terrain.</p>
<p><b>Peacemaking, Peace Enforcement, Stability</b> – involving Formed Police and General Duty Police, Military Units and Humanitarian Actors from the threshold of armed conflict to the cessation of armed conflict and conflict resolution.</p> <p><b>Peace enforcement</b> is the coercive use of legitimate civil and military action, including intervention, to maintain and restore international peace and security (Chapter VII of the UN Charter).</p> <p><b>Peacekeeping</b> is a non-coercive response mechanism that involves legitimate international civil and military components with the consent of conflicting parties (Chapter VI of the UN Charter).</p>	<p><b>Population Protection</b> – includes actions to provide immediate security to threatened populations IOT control residence, identity, movement, assembly and the distribution of commodities; therefore, setting the conditions for the re-establishment of law and order.</p> <p><b>Population Support</b> – includes actions to provide essential services to affected communities IOT relieve immediate suffering and positively influence the population and their perceptions. Closely aligned to Public Information – actions to inform and shape the perceptions, attitudes, behaviour and understanding of target population groups.</p>
<p><b>Peace Building (Restoration Capacity Building)</b> – includes stability, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts focused on societal and institutional rebuilding and capacity development.</p>	<p><b>Indigenous Capacity Building</b> – includes actions taken by the Land Force to assist in the development of effective indigenous Government, security, police, legal, financial and administrative systems.</p>

**Table 1-1: Complementary ADF-AFP Operations**

<sup>2</sup> Charles C. Krulak, 31st Commandant of the US Marine Corps, *The Three Block War: Fighting in Urban Areas*, National Press Club, 15 December 1997.

<sup>3</sup> ADDP 3.8, *Peace Operations*, Chapter 1, p. 1-19.

<sup>4</sup> ADFP 3.8.1, *Peace Operations*, Planning and Procedures, Chapter 5, p. 5-3.

<sup>5</sup> The AFP Submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade – *Inquiry into Australia’s Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations* dated March 2007, p.7



law'.<sup>6</sup> This may occur in conjunction with the conduct of Joint Land Combat operations, or may be conducted as the initial response to intense civil unrest that does not involve known belligerent forces.

Recent peace and stability operations have shown that the collapse or weakening of indigenous policing, security and/or legal frameworks creates a law and order vacuum that places the responsibility of imposing internal law and order on the ADF. In such circumstances, the military will most likely be mandated to perform executive police functions, and will be required to apply extant domestic law or International Humanitarian Law (IHL) to restore and maintain law and order until the transition of responsibility to an international CIVPOL component. The ADF is generally not structured or trained for the inherent challenges of restoring and maintaining law and order within a collapsed or failed state;<sup>7</sup> therefore, must utilise the specialist skills of its MP in order to ensure mission success.

### Military Police Capabilities in Peace and Stability Operations

MP provide a comprehensive operational policing service to operations throughout the spectrum of conflict,<sup>8</sup> and are both trained and equipped to support the critical components of restoring and maintaining law and order as part of its four primary functions detailed in LWD 0-1-3 *Military Policing*. Table 1-2 illustrates the specialist support MP provide to the restoration and maintenance of law and order.

Support to the restoration and maintenance of law and order, as part of *Population Protection* operations, forms part of MP support to all lines of operation undertaken by the ADF. The restoration and maintenance of law and order enhances *Public Support* operations through the provision of an essential policing service to affected communities. Engagement with the local population during the execution of various policing functions promote MP as an essential mechanism for the dissemination and monitoring of key information messages as part of *Public Information* operations. The contribution of MP to the development of key indigenous policing, legal and security

Restoring and Maintaining Law and Order (ADFP 3.8.1)	MP Support (LWD 0-1-3)
Application of Law	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interpretation of applicable domestic law/IHL/Status Of Forces Agreement (SOFA).</li> <li>• Development of operational SOPs to align military actions with applicable laws.</li> <li>• Pre-deployment/in-theatre training of ADF personnel.</li> </ul>
Power of Arrest	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Operational advice/guidance regarding the application of arrest procedures.</li> <li>• Tactical support to apprehension tasks.</li> <li>• Use of force (less lethal techniques).</li> </ul>
Power of Detention	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development of operational SOPs regarding detention policy and guidelines.</li> <li>• Classification of detained personnel.</li> <li>• Management of ADF Detention Facilities IAW IHL and International Humanitarian Rights (IHR) standards.</li> <li>• Transfer of detained personnel to Host Nation (HN) judicial and prison components.</li> </ul>
Investigation of Offences	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Investigation of minor and major criminal offences IAW domestic law/IHL.</li> <li>• Collection of evidence in relation to offences detected.</li> <li>• Crime/incident scene preservation.</li> </ul>
Judicial Capability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Correct storage and continuity of evidence to facilitate the successful prosecution of detained personnel.</li> <li>• Support to the re-establishment of the HN judicial system, or establishment of a military judicial mechanism.</li> </ul>
Liaison	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development of agreed methods of operation involving combined/joint ADF/CIVPOL patrols, arrest and handover procedures etc.</li> <li>• Synchronisation of civilian and military policing activity.</li> <li>• Exchange of criminal intelligence (CRIMINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT) to enhance situational awareness.</li> <li>• Development of force protection policy/guidelines.</li> <li>• Support to the transition of operational leadership and responsibility.</li> </ul>

Table 1-2: MP Support to the Restoration and Maintenance of Law and Order

stakeholders as part of *Indigenous Capacity Building* initiatives facilitates the effective transition of responsibility, and contributes to the success of the Land Force exit strategy. Finally, MP are trained and individually equipped to provide Combat

Policing<sup>9</sup> support to units conducting *Joint Land Combat* operations. A distinct lack of Protected Mobility Vehicles within MP operational units, however, significantly impedes the ability of collective MP elements to integrate within any Combat

<sup>6</sup> Dr Mike Kelly, Crime Experts to Patrol Hot Zones, Canberra Times, 17/05/2008, p. 7.

<sup>7</sup> ADFP 3.8.1, p. 5-12.

<sup>8</sup> LWD 0-1-3, *Military Policing*, Chapter 1, p. 1-1.

<sup>9</sup> Combat Policing involves the ability to operate and conduct policing functions in a medium to high threat environment.



Team or Battle Group operating within a medium to high threat environment.

The deployment of Joint Task Force (JTF) 631 to Timor Leste in 2006 emphasised the fundamental role of MP in the military-led restoration and maintenance of law and order in a collapsed or failed state. The nature of tasks completed by the MP in Timor Leste (see Case Study – Timor Leste 2006) illustrates the constabulary capabilities and military-police cooperation that already exists within the ADF. Subsequently, the ADF does not need to ‘grow’ such capabilities for future peace and stability operations, as suggested by MAJGEN Smith, for it already possesses an organisation with the training, cooperation and operational experiences necessary to enhance ADF-AFP interoperability.

### Commonality of Military and Civilian Police

The ability of the MP to perform tasks similar in nature to that of CIVPOL is attributed to the commonality of training undertaken. Training completed by MP at the Defence Police Training Centre, including specialist Investigative, Close Personal Protection (CPP) and MP Dog (MPD) training, corresponds with national policing competencies adopted by Australian State and Federal law-enforcement agencies. This commonality of training enables the MP to comprehend and adapt CIVPOL practices and procedures to the military environment, both domestically and offshore.

Commonality of training has been fostered into a ‘sound working relationship at the operational and tactical level’<sup>10</sup> through ongoing training, domestic liaison and operational cooperation between MP and CIVPOL. The establishment of various Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) between the MP and State and Federal CIVPOL has facilitated continuous military-police cooperation in relation to training and domestic general duties policing. This frequent interaction has established a mutual understanding of respective policies and procedures, and ability of MP to adapt to the changing role of deployed CIVPOL components.

The structure and capability of CIVPOL components deployed during recent complex peace and stability operations has varied from traditional monitoring roles to the provision of executive police powers, and the involvement of ready reaction units. The AFP has identified the need for a highly trained and well-resourced organisation capable of providing a rapid law-enforcement response and long-term stability capacity to offshore internal conflicts. This has been achieved through the development of the AFP IDG.

### Development of the AFP IDG

As Australia’s major international law-enforcement agency, the AFP understands that ‘policing is as much about diplomatic, security, cooperation and capacity building in the international arena as it is about the traditional values of community-based policing’<sup>11</sup>. The AFP IDG was established in February 2004 to manage the deployment of Australian and Pacific Island police deployed overseas and ‘provides an opportunity for Australian and Pacific Island police to operate in a collaborative environment as part of a Whole-of-Government response to challenging International issues’<sup>12</sup>.

In August 2006, the Federal Government increased funding of the IDG with an additional \$493 million to boost staffing levels to approximately 1200 personnel by 2008. The increased funding will provide the IDG with the opportunity to develop long-term international policing initiatives that will contribute to the maintenance of a stable and secure Pacific region. Such initiatives

have been implemented within countries in which the ADF are currently deployed (Timor Leste, Solomon Islands and Tonga) and ‘fragile’ regional countries which may require the deployment of ADF elements in the future. The organisational structure of the IDG is depicted in Figure 1-2.

The increased funding will also enable the IDG to establish a 200-strong ORG, which ‘will be a tactical and highly skilled capability in crowd control and riot management with rapid deployment capability’<sup>13</sup> supported by a Specialist Operational Support Team (SOST). The structural and mandated growth of the IDG, particularly the ORG, demonstrates the emergence of the IDG as a leading International CIVPOL organisation, and an essential partner of the MP contribution to ADF-AFP interoperability initiatives.

### MP Contributions to ADF-AFP Interoperability Initiatives

Given the increasing complexity of modern peace and stability operations, both the ADF and AFP have identified the need for enhanced interoperability that supports a Whole-of-Government approach to offshore contingencies involving the military and police. The AFP aims to enhance ‘interdepartmental coordination and cooperation through improved interoperability between the AFP and ADF’<sup>14</sup> and has implemented several initiatives since the establishment of the IDG to provide AFP input into ADF joint doctrine, planning, education and training. Of particular interest is the recent appointment of one AFP officer to the ADFWC and two officers to HQ JOC.



Figure 1-2: Organisational Structure of the AFP IDG

<sup>10</sup> ADFP 3.8.1, p. 5-12.

<sup>11</sup> Conference Booklet – *International Policing Toward 2020*, pp. 1-2.

<sup>12</sup> <http://www.afp.gov.au/international/IDG.html>

<sup>13</sup> Platypus – Journal of the Australian Federal Police, Edition 96, *Policing the neighbourhood and keeping peace in the Pacific*, p. 11.

<sup>14</sup> The AFP Submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade – Inquiry into Australia’s Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations dated March 2007, p. 9.





ADF initiatives to enhance interoperability with the AFP have, to date, been primarily focused on AFP contributions to ADF-led planning, education and training. In light of the rapid growth of the IDG, and shared visions of enhanced interoperability, the ADF has been afforded an ideal opportunity to provide direct input into the development of AFP doctrine, planning and training.

Contemporary definitions of the term 'interoperability' include 'the ability... to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks',<sup>15</sup> hence, the development of effective interoperability between military and law-enforcement components is significantly enhanced by an organisation that understands the intrinsic nature of both entities and can adapt accordingly. The commonality of training, frequency of domestic CIVPOL liaison and operational experiences (in law enforcement and detention) of the MP is without comparison within the ADF; therefore, making it the most suitable organisation to significantly contribute to, and possibly lead, future ADF-AFP interoperability initiatives.

In 2006, the National Security Council identified a requirement for greater interoperability between the ADF and AFP for the conduct of stabilisation operations in the region. Eight working groups were established to review the interoperability between the two organisations in areas such as coordination, integrated planning and logistics at the strategic, operational and tactical level. The eight working groups identified a total of 120 recommendations, following 'wide consultation with related areas within each organisation',<sup>16</sup> which were further reduced to 42 recommendations.

Of the 42 recommendations outlined within the *Interoperability Review Between the Australian Defence Force and the Australian Federal Police for Regional Stabilisation Operations*, 17 recommendations demonstrate an explicit nexus with the current roles and responsibilities of MP. It should be noted that despite the assertion of 'wide consultation with related areas within each organisation', MP were not represented, nor afforded the opportunity to contribute, during the conduct of the review.

Appendix 1 outlines the 17 recommendations that encompass the broad spectrum of




Figure 1-3: Operational and Tactical Interoperability Frameworks

the eight interoperability working groups, and highlights the various implementation mechanisms to address each recommendation identified. The implementation mechanisms include the enhancement of extant mechanisms, particularly in relation to training and doctrine development, and the development of operational and tactical interoperability frameworks.

### Enhancing Operational Interoperability

The ability to shape ADF planning at the earliest stages, and facilitate interoperability with the AFP at the operational level, is best achieved through formal MP representation within key organisations such as HQ JOC (Operations and Plans) and/or AHQ (Regional and Domestic Operations). Representation within HQ JOC, as shown in Figure 1-3, mirrors recent interoperability initiatives by the AFP and ensures that the development of interoperable capability, training and doctrine is fostered at the tactical level. Without appropriate representation during the planning stage of a peace and stability operation, the force structure of a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) will

often lack the necessary MP capabilities to facilitate tactical interoperability.

### Enhancing Tactical Interoperability

The ability to expand ADF-AFP interoperability within an operational and/or domestic context to tactical interoperability within a theatre of operation will be best achieved through a structured framework that promotes cooperation and coordination between key law-enforcement agencies. Full tactical interoperability is the end state of any initiative implemented at the operational or strategic level, for it is at the tactical level that success of any peace and stability operation will be achieved. The implementation of a Joint Interagency Policing Coordination Cell (JIPCC) and employment of Joint Interagency Policing Teams (JIPTs) are two such frameworks that will enhance tactical interoperability.

### Joint Interagency Policing Coordination Cell (JIPCC)

The JIPCC, as depicted in Figure 1-3, is based on a doctrinal Joint Provost Marshal

<sup>15</sup> Interoperability Review Between the Australian Defence Force and the Australian Federal Police for Regional Stabilisation Operations, 2007, p. 7.

<sup>16</sup> *ibid.*



(JPM) Cell enhanced by the embedment of military and civilian police Liaison Officers within key cell functions. The JIPCC is centralised at the highest appropriate level of command, generally within HQ JIATF, and provides the necessary planning, liaison and coordination for Constabulary Operations<sup>17</sup> within a joint interagency framework. The embedment of MP, AFP (international CIVPOL) and indigenous CIVPOL within the JIPCC facilitates the ‘development and implementation of protocols and procedures, at the tactical level, for combined tasking’<sup>18</sup> during the conduct of peace and stability operations. Additionally, it allows a ‘constant flow of information between each organisation and a clear communication of the responses required for different tasks and challenges’<sup>19</sup>. More importantly, however, the JIPCC facilitates the ‘seamless transition from military control to police control, vice versa and/or indigenous authorities’<sup>20</sup> as key policing agencies contribute to the conduct of Constabulary Operations throughout the entire spectrum of peace and stability operations.

The JIPCC is primarily responsible for the provision of policing support by four task-organised building blocks that include General Duties, Investigations, Detention and Specialist capabilities. In addition to supporting these four task-organised building blocks, deployed MP assets remain postured to provide Combat Policing support to combat forces operating within a medium to high threat environment.

### Interagency Policing Coordination Cell Tactical (JIPCC Tac)

The JIPCC Tac is based on the functions of the JIPCC, however, is a temporary mechanism to provide the necessary liaison and coordination during the conduct of specific Constabulary Operations. The JIPCC Tac facilitates the establishment of a Tactical Combined Command Post and employment of common Combined Command Post procedures, and is located far enough forward to influence the conduct of Constabulary Operations.

### Joint Interagency Policing Team (JIPT)

A JIPT is an effects-based capability brick that is task-organised to provide specialist policing support within a complex and rapidly changing environment. The complementary nature of the each JIPT facilitates tactical interoperability between MP, AFP (international CIVPOL) and indigenous CIVPOL, and the seamless transition of command and control between each organisation. The versatile structure, training and equipment of the JIPT is fundamental to the application of precise, discriminate and tailored effects commensurate with the complex conflict environment.

<sup>17</sup> Constabulary Operations are operations in which indigenous or imposed judicial processes have primacy or are a consideration. This definition encompasses operations that, by their nature, are conducted in a medium to low threat environment to restore and maintain law and order.

<sup>18</sup> Interoperability Review Between the Australian Defence Force and the Australian Federal Police for Regional Stabilisation Operations, p.10.

<sup>19</sup> *ibid*

<sup>20</sup> *ibid*

# Case Study -

In May 2006, intense civil unrest erupted in Timor Leste (TL) following the sacking of 595 Timor Leste Defence Force (F-FDTL) soldiers by the Prime Minister, Mari Alkatiri. Fighting between the F-FDTL and the Timor Leste National Police Force (PNTL) resulted in the collapse of law and order, security and judicial frameworks throughout the country. Subsequently, the Government of Timor Leste (GOTL) requested international support to restore and maintain law and order, and provide humanitarian relief to displaced persons forced to flee the fighting.

The ADF response to the intrastate violence was the establishment of Joint Task Force (JTF) 631 and the deployment of approximately 2200 personnel supported by aviation and maritime components. Despite the collapse of law and order, domestic Timorese law (framed within the TL Criminal Procedure Code) remained extant. Additionally, ADF personnel were permitted to exercise the powers of the PNTL, under the SOFA, for the purpose of establishing security and stability.

The MP contingent deployed as part of JTF 631 comprised of a General Duties (GD) platoon with attached MPD, CPP and Investigator capabilities. Although significantly small in size, the MP contingent provided the following specialist support to JTF 631 efforts to restore and maintain law and order, in accordance with doctrinal functions detailed in LWD 0-1-3:



## Law Enforcement

- Conduct of joint patrols with the AFP.
- Arrest and detention support to AFP and Battle Group (BG) cordon and search operations.
- MPD support to AFP GD operations.
- Support to the conduct of investigations by AFP and United Nations Police (UNPOL).
- Collection and preservation of evidence.



# Timor Leste 2006



## Detention Operations

- Establishment and maintenance of a Defence Detention Facility (DDF).
- Establishment of a Detention Management Team (DMT).
- Support to the re-establishment of the TL judicial system.
- Review and amendment of JTF 631 SOPs on Apprehension, Search, Disarmament and Detention IOT align with the TL Criminal Procedure Code.

## Security Operations

- C2 support to BG Population Protection and Control (PPC) operations.
- Provision of CPP to key TL Government Ministers and other VIPs.
- Physical security of the Dili District Court IOT facilitate judicial proceedings.
- Provision of MP GD and MPD capabilities to the Commander's Reserve Force.



The MP contingent maintained a key responsibility for the restoration and maintenance of law and order within the Dili region for a period of four months. During the period June – October 2006, the contingent processed in excess of 1000 criminal detainees, and was instrumental in the re-invigoration of the fledgling TL

judicial system. The ability of the MP contingent to provide a diverse range of specialist policing support, in conjunction with the AFP and UNPOL, enabled effective interim measures to be implemented until UNPOL was capable of assuming operational leadership. Additionally, the ability of the MP contingent to

rapidly assimilate extant domestic laws and procedures, and foster strong operational cooperation with key international CIVPOL components, was attributed to its commonality of training and operational (domestic and offshore) experiences with CIVPOL.



## Conclusion

The evolution of modern peace and stability operations has resulted in an increasing need for the ADF to perform a constabulary role in a medium to low threat environment, until the transition of responsibility to indigenous and/or international CIVPOL components. The military-led restoration and maintenance of law and order has been a key element of the ADF response to recent internal conflicts in which the rule of law and legal system is either weak or has collapsed. The ADF is generally not structured or trained for the inherent challenges of conducting Constabulary Operations, a concept previously undefined within Land Doctrine. Subsequently, it must utilise the unique training, skills and experience of its MP to achieve precise, discriminate and tailored effects commensurate with the complex conflict environment, as demonstrated in Timor Leste in 2006.

As the AFP seeks to enhance its interoperability with the ADF, and establish the IDG as a leading international CIVPOL organisation, the commonality of training, cooperation and operational experiences of the MP makes it the most suitable organisation to contribute to, and lead, ADF-AFP interoperability initiatives. Extant MP-AFP training and domestic cooperation mechanisms, combined with the development of operational and tactical interoperability frameworks such as the JIPCC, will enable MP to address no less than 17 recommendations made by the eight ADF-AFP interoperability working groups. Through the implementation of extant and developmental concepts, and greater contribution to future interoperability initiatives, the MP will maintain a fundamental role in enhancing ADF-AFP interoperability on peace and stability operations.

## Appendix 1: Key ADF-AFP Interoperability Working Group Recommendations

### Legal Working Group

**004 - Map out existing legal arrangements between the ADF/AFP such as MOUs and establish the status of these arrangements.**

- Review of the 'Memorandum of Understanding Between the Australian

Federal Police and Department of Defence on Enhanced Cooperation on Policing Matters' dated 7 Aug 07

### Planning Working Group

**017 - Identify and report on opportunities for the increased use of liaison embedded and exchange officers between elements of the ADF and AFP.**

- Secondment or exchange of MP personnel to the Capability and Development Branch or ORG (Capability Development and Special Projects) of the AFP IDG in order to develop doctrine, SOPs, TTPs and training.
- Embedding a MP LO within HQ JOC (Operations and/or Plans)
- Embedding MP personnel within a Joint Interagency Policing Coordination Cell (JIPCC) in theatre.

**019 - Develop mechanisms and processes for interagency planning regarding intelligence sharing at the strategic and operational levels.**

- Development of criminal intelligence mechanisms as part of the all-source intelligence cell.

**065 - Investigate and make recommendations on the development of a combined ADF/AFP Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI) and exploitation capability.**

- Contribution to WTI development program.

### Operations Working Group

**036 - Develop protocols and procedures, at the tactical level, to allow effective tasking of combined interagency forces, and to support seamless transitions from military to police, and where necessary to indigenous authorities.**

- Development of JIPCC protocols and procedures.
- Combined interagency training to examine, review and amend JIPCC protocols and procedures.

**042 - Clarification and possible enhancement of the role of MP and the AFP in joint operations or at time of handover. The review is to address investigative capability, detainee management, forensics and prosecution.**

- Development of the JIPCC and Joint Interagency Policing Teams (JIPTs),

including the identification and conduct of training opportunities.

**049 - Investigate operational command responsibility, relationships between ADF/AFP commanders at the tactical level.**

- Contribution to the Operations Working Group.

**051 - Investigation into the adoption of a Tactical Combined Command Post and the development of common Combined Command Post procedures.**

- Development of the JIPCC Tactical (JIPCC Tac) concept.

**052 - Investigation into how Military Personnel Support Detachments (PSDs)/AFP Close Personnel Protection (CPP) and Very Important Persons (VIPs) are to be handled and organised with regards to management of protection responsibilities.**

- Review the RACMP CPP contribution to this issue considering the position of RACMP as the Training Adviser for CPP. Confirm PSD authorised training with Defence.

**053 - Establish a mechanism, prior to deployment, the factors and level of threat that will determine whether a tactical situation requires a military or police response.**

- Contribution to the Operations Working Group.

### Intelligence Working Group

**062 - Develop mechanisms and processes for interagency intelligence sharing at the tactical level.**

- Development of criminal intelligence mechanisms as part of the all-source intelligence cell.

### Doctrine, Education and Training (DET) Working Group

**071 - Develop training regimes to inculcate a joint ADF and AFP approach to operations at the tactical level.**

- Reciprocal attendance on ADF/AFP training, across the entire spectrum of interagency policing will inculcate a joint ADF/AFP approach.

**075 - Examine and make recommendations on making terminology standard, where appropriate, between the ADF and AFP - including doctrine and acronyms.**



- Examination of current terminology/language employed by MP.

**077 - Identify ADF/AFP training that may be suitable for ADF/AFP attendance and develop a mechanism to encourage and expedite access to such training.**

- AFP participation in MP-specific training (MRT, DPTC courses, 1 MP Bn exercises, etc).
- MP participation in AFP-specific training (ORG exercises, IDPD, etc).
- AFP participation in ADF training and planning exercises (MRE, VITAL series, etc).
- Identification and development of training required to address ADF/AFP capability gaps.
- Enhancement and/or development of the extant ADF/AFP MOU (Enhancing Policing Matters) to expedite access to such training.

**079 - Investigate whether training can be made into a Nationally recognised standard.**

- Review (mapping) of current competency standards for MP training.

**080 - Investigate incorporating ADF/AFP lecturing on each others capabilities at appropriate levels of Defence and the AFP training institutions.**

- Identification of suitable ADF/AFP courses, seminars, training activities, etc that will facilitate the exchange of organisational information.

### Capability Working Group

**120 - The development of less lethal capability needs to provide individual, joint ADF/AFP teams and combined arms teams with an enhanced graduated response capability. This needs to include close quarter and stand off less lethal capabilities.**

- Contribution to the Joint Non-Lethal Capability program.

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# The Royal Australian Corps of Military Police: The Force of 'No Choice' for Deployed Law Enforcement?

*What makes Military Police formations so unique is the skills acquired through Law Enforcement (LE) training and employment... Unquestionably, the greatest risk to the Military Police Corps is the loss of the LE skill set.*

- Lieutenant Colonel Chad McRee, US Army MP Regiment.<sup>1</sup>

## Introduction

The US Army MP Regiment seek to be 'The Force of Choice' due to their operational versatility, but the quote above indicates their focus on Law Enforcement. According to LWP-G 0-1-10 Military Police Tactics Techniques and Procedures, Law Enforcement is divided into maintenance of military discipline and maintenance of civilian law. In late 1999, Military Police (MPs) contributed significantly to domestic Law Enforcement in East Timor.<sup>2</sup> However there was little MP involvement in the many large scale deliberate arrest operations targeting multiple-murder suspects in Solomon Islands. The arrests were made by civilian police and infantrymen from the member nations of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) with some support from MP dog handlers. The early success of Combined Task Force (CTF) 635 and the RAMSI Participating Police Forces (PPF); and the subsequent formation of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) International Deployment Group

(IDG); have raised questions over the role of the military as law enforcers in conflict zones.<sup>3</sup> The AFP have identified the need to develop their interoperability with other departments, particularly the ADF. They question the traditional assertion that 'peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it.'<sup>4</sup> Similarly, some MP soldiers and officers are questioning the 'police' element of functions such as Mobility and Manoeuvre Support and Security.<sup>5</sup>

In 2005, the Australian Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee noted problems with Royal Australian Corps of Military Police (RACMP) investigations in the Military Justice System and recommended that the AFP investigate all allegations of criminal activity by deployed ADF members.<sup>6</sup> While the formation of the Australian Defence Force Investigation Service (ADFIS) may have changed this direction, it has made the 'high end' of policing the military a specialist task executed by a Joint organisation. So where is the place of operational MPs in Law Enforcement?<sup>7</sup> One response to these circumstances would be to leave maintenance of discipline to ADFIS and domestic Law Enforcement to civilian police while focussing operational MPs on Security, Mobility and Manoeuvre Support (MMS) and Internment and Detention Operations

(IDOPS) – all currently in demand in collective training and on operations. However, this paper argues that there will often be no choice but to use operational RACMP elements for deployed Law Enforcement. The aim of this paper is to argue that Law Enforcement not only remains a critical MP task and skill, but provides the capability and culture that underpins the execution of the other MP functions.

## Policing the force

This paper argues that deployed soldiers are generally best policed by soldiers. Civilian police are not under military command. While this may have some advantages in ensuring impartiality, civilian police will have their own priorities. These will probably (and appropriately) place domestic or international Law Enforcement ahead of disciplining the deployed force, except in extreme cases. The importance of the RACMP Law Enforcement capability was noted on the first rotation of Operation Anode, despite the number of AFP in theatre. It was not in their mission to concern themselves with soldiers' weapon security or compliance with anti-malaria measures, and their workload was such that assistance to the CTF in the investigation of serious offences was a significant impost.<sup>8</sup> It may be expected that ADFIS investigators

<sup>1</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Chad McRee, 'The Employment of Military Police Formations: The Synchronisation of Military Police in BCTs,' Military Police Bulletin, Spring 2008, accessed at <http://www.wood.army.mil/mpbulletin/>

<sup>2</sup> Michael G. Smith with Maureen Dee, *Peacekeeping in East Timor*, Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2002, p 141, and Chief of Defence Force INTERFET Report, May 2000, p6. (Note that this is a restricted document, but the fact of MP provision of domestic policing is commonly known, as indicated by Smith and Dee, op cit.)

<sup>3</sup> Australian Federal Police Submission to the Senate Committee on Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade Inquiry into Australia's Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations, March 2007, p2; and Superintendent Tim Dahlstrom, *The Role of the Australian Federal Police in Peacekeeping Operations: An Opportunity for Cooperation and Preventative Action*, Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, 2007, pp 4 and 9.

<sup>4</sup> Australian Federal Police Op cit, p2.

<sup>5</sup> Captain Thomas Mott, 'Police Intelligence Operations: Future Focus of the Military Police Corps,' in Military Police Bulletin, April 2006, accessed at, <http://www.wood.army.mil/mpbulletin/>.

<sup>6</sup> Australian Senate, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee Inquiry Report, *The Effectiveness of Australia's Military Justice System*, June 2005, p 55.

<sup>7</sup> The term 'operational MPs' in this paper refers collectively to general duties, Close Personal Protection operators and dog handlers.

<sup>8</sup> This is the writer's personal observation as J5 (Police Operations) on this rotation. These duties included obtaining AFP support for the CTF's SIB investigator when required. This observation is supported by the legal annex to the 2003 Operation Anode Post Operational Report. This is a restricted document, but the reference has been cleared as 'unclassified' by COMD CTF 635 Rotation 1.



will investigate serious criminal offences by deployed soldiers. However, the limited numbers of ADFIS, and the lack of land combat survival training of investigators from the other services, will limit their availability and endurance in an area. There will always be too many offences for just ADFIS to investigate, and ADFIS may well need assistance from operational MPs. Further, even minor discipline offences, unless dealt with through the Discipline Officer Scheme, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, and it can be as difficult to prove weapon insecurity as fraud.<sup>9</sup> Therefore all MPs should be capable of investigating the range of offences they are likely to confront, and providing 'first response' or other support to ADFIS; and should treat every investigation with the expectation of a contested trial.<sup>10</sup> While successive inquiries into Military Justice have criticised RACMP Law Enforcement skills, they have done so in the context of wider problems in applying the Defence Force Discipline Act in accordance with legal best practice.<sup>11</sup> The RACMP must move with the progress of the Military Justice System, rather than hanging back with those who complain that 'there is too much law in it.'

### Policing the Area of Operations

Policing is likely to be important in all operations and particularly important in stability operations, including counterinsurgency.<sup>12</sup> The increasing links between transnational crime groups and insurgent / militia organisations take the importance of Law Enforcement past the level of treating threat forces like criminals (ie, as

combatants who have committed violent crimes in achieving a political end). In many cases, the threat forces are criminals by occupation (ie, their crimes are motivated by profit).<sup>13</sup> Civilian police will generally provide the strongest investigative capability, and their primacy constitutes a notable step towards the re-establishment of civilian authority. The AFP have clearly identified the part they play in stabilisation operations, have taken significant steps to address it, and have gained a degree of confidence in deployed policing.<sup>14</sup> However, civilian police are not members of the profession of arms.<sup>15</sup>

The reason that deployed forces are required for domestic Law Enforcement is generally that domestic forces have been unable to provide it – often because of the threat or conditions. Even police tactical groups (PTGs), who are extremely highly trained for their role, will have lower operational survivability, endurance and risk acceptance than military forces; and their planning and operational analysis procedures may be less suitable for austere or high threat environments. Further, the majority of deployed police will not have the para-military training of PTGs.<sup>16</sup> This factor should be viewed in the context of arguments by current strategic commentators that there is a requirement in conflict situations to accept casualties containing crime.<sup>17</sup> This makes it likely that civilian police will not operate in certain areas, and will only operate in some other areas with military support. This is demonstrated by interagency operations in Solomon Islands

and Iraq.<sup>18 19</sup> Major General Jim Molan advises, 'the military must be prepared to... provide, at least in the early stages of a conflict, almost everything that will be required.'<sup>20</sup> MPs, as soldiers, can be trained – and ordered – to operate in austere or high threat conditions, to integrate with combat forces, and to conduct and contribute to military planning. They may be in theatre prior to civilian police, particularly on short notice missions. At the same time, they should be more capable than riflemen at Law Enforcement, either on their own, or when integrated with civilian police to create a more survivable police organisation.<sup>21</sup>

### Benefits of a Law Enforcement culture

Apart from its direct operational application, rigorous maintenance of the Law Enforcement capability would promote the development of knowledge, skills and attitudes desirable both in the other MP functions and the wider Army.

**Law Enforcement ethos.** US Army Captain Thomas Mott has claimed (when stressing the importance of Law Enforcement), 'Any soldier can be trained to conduct route reconnaissance, traffic control, river crossings, route security and traffic security.'<sup>22</sup> However, it is argued here that MMS, IDOPS, and Security involve compliance with law, orders or standards, either actively enforced (such as a movement plan), or governing conduct (such as law regarding use of force underpinning CPP, or IHL underpinning IDOPS). Therefore soldiers will be better at these tasks if they

<sup>9</sup> Personal observation as a Defending Officer in the first and an Arresting Officer in the second.

<sup>10</sup> The writer's observation is that the SIB investigator mentioned above was well assisted in a major investigation by an Operational MP.

<sup>11</sup> Australian Senate, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee Op cit, pp 27 – 57.

<sup>12</sup> Steven Metz and Ray Millen, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Twenty-First Century: Reconceptualising Threat and Response*, 2004, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, accessed at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/publication-search-results.cfm?criteria=metz+millen+insurgency&submit=Go> and <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/publication-search-results.cfm?criteria=metz+millen+insurgency&submit=Go>, and Lieutenant Colonel Mark O'Neill, 'Back to the Future: The Enduring Characteristics of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,' *Australian Army Journal*, Winter 2008, pp 50 – 51.

<sup>13</sup> Steven Metz, 'Insurgency After the Cold War,' *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 1994, Ch 5, pp 63 – 82, cited in Ian Beckett, 'The Future of Insurgency,' *Australian Army Journal*, Winter 2008, pp 269 – 70. Steven Metz, 'New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency,' *Australian Army Journal*, Winter 2008, pp 34–35; and Dahlstrom, Op cit, p 11.

<sup>14</sup> Dahlstrom, Op cit.

<sup>15</sup> This is recognised in the AFP submission to the Senate Inquiry into Australia's Involvement in Peacekeeping (Op cit) with the identification of peak police involvement periods in pre- and post- conflict phases (pp 5 – 6).

<sup>16</sup> Personal observation as J5 (Police Operations) and later COMD CTF 635. This is not intended as a slight against PTGs or their members, but an assertion that there are 'horses for courses'.

<sup>17</sup> Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, cited in Lieutenant Colonel Eric Ashworth, 'Secure the Victory: Is it Time for a Stabilisation and Reconstruction Command?' Ch 9 in Williamson Murray, *A Nation at War in an Era of Strategic Change*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2004, accessed at, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=580>

<sup>18</sup> It was the writer's observation that the RAMSI PPF generally applied higher minimum requirements of infrastructure, rationing, amenity, etc.

<sup>19</sup> Major Gordon J. Knowles, 'Countering Terrorist, Insurgent and Criminal Organisations: Iraqi Security Forces Joint Coordination Centres – A Unique Public Safety Initiative', *Military Police Bulletin*, Autumn 2006, accessed at, <http://www.wood.army.mil/mpbulletin/>

<sup>20</sup> Major General Jim Molan, 'Thoughts of a Practitioner: A Contribution to Australia's Counterinsurgency Doctrine Drafters,' *Australian Army Journal*, Winter 2008, p 227.

<sup>21</sup> Beyond the statement of the obvious here, military police interoperability in RAMSI was dependent on clear limits on the use of riflemen in quasi police roles, and there were insufficient MPs for the military to fill the gap, so the military were practically able to use few of the powers they held under the Solomon Islands Facilitation of International Assistance Act. That said, the availability of MPs will generally not negate the requirement for riflemen. As with the distinction between PTGs and military forces, there are 'horses for courses'.

<sup>22</sup> Mott, Op cit.



have a strong command – and ethos – of Law Enforcement. The US experience in Abu Ghraib is a good example of what can happen when MPs lose touch with the Rule of Law. Further, the maintenance of such an ethos in RACMP will benefit ADFIS as, like state police Criminal Investigation Branches, they will be able to recruit from an experienced and proficient uniformed pool. Finally, since the law is based on the application of logic, a Law Enforcement ethos promotes logical thought, preparing MP soldiers and officers for wider employment, particularly in operations, plans and personnel staff positions.

**Knowledge of human nature.** Law Enforcement involves contact with a wide range of people, often in potentially confrontational, stressful or deceptive circumstances. This develops objectivity (particularly, a considered transition from receiving information to believing it). It fosters the ‘soft’ skills to ‘read’ or convince people. Further, it fosters inquisitiveness. These traits are equally necessary when processing Captured Persons, directing stragglers, or dealing with an irate convoy commander. Again this prepares MPs for wider employment.<sup>23</sup>

**Coercive confidence:** MPs are the coercive arm of command and control. Law Enforcement entails influencing others to comply with orders or standards, or bringing them back into compliance. While it might be desirable to do this through example, information and leadership; it will sometimes require confrontation, prosecution and, occasionally, force. Law Enforcement experience develops the skills to resolve confrontations and influence people to ‘follow the rules’ with the least confrontation possible – equally important in the other three functions.<sup>24</sup> Apart from making MPs generally more confident as NCOs or officers, this can have significant operational benefits, as demonstrated by Waffen SS Corporal Wilhelm Schmidt’s reconnaissance mission in Operation Greif in December 1944:

*We had no difficulty penetrating the American line [wearing US Army uniform and speaking ‘American’ English] and reached the bridge at Aywaille twenty-five miles behind the front in just over half an hour. Here we were stopped by an American military policeman; not knowing the password, we were arrested.*<sup>25</sup>

**Common culture:** As Lieutenant Colonel Trent Scott argues, ‘we have not yet achieved true whole of government cooperation, particularly at the tactical level.’<sup>26</sup> Interoperability in a Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF) usually relies on Liaison Officers. Police liaison is not always assigned to MPs, but sharing the Law Enforcement culture is a clear advantage. The history of CTF 635 has often seen liaison tasks assigned to combat arms officers with civilian police backgrounds (including the writer in 2003, and both G3s who served under the writer in 2005/6), with positive effects.<sup>27</sup> While these personality-based solutions have worked on an ad hoc basis, they are not systemically reliable. A more guaranteed solution is to provide MPs as Liaison Officers, particularly if MPs, like civilian police, see themselves as agents of the Rule of Law, regardless (but not exclusive) of agency or nationality. Again, this is consistent with US experience.<sup>28</sup>

## Implications

It appears that there will often be no choice but to use MPs for Law Enforcement on deployment, and that ensuring they are prepared for the task will carry benefits for the other RACMP functions and wider employment. This indicates that MPs must achieve three things to provide value up to their potential.

First, MPs must consistently demonstrate proficiency in Law Enforcement and hold the confidence of senior ADF officers and government. The negative observations on MP Law Enforcement capability – some from RACMP members – in the various inquiries and reports into military justice are a matter of public record, and the suggestion that some work is required to regain confi-

dence should not be taken as a slight against serving MPs, or a suggestion that this work is not being done already.<sup>29</sup> This will require that MPs patiently apply their skills and treat each case with the expectation of a contested trial from the most minor cases up.

Second, MPs must maintain the military capability to operate beyond the range or outside the tasking of unsupported civilian police. Casualties can’t enforce the law. This will require operational proficiency in MMS, IDOPS and Security, as well as the fostering of operational planning, battle procedure and close combat skills in both collective and individual training.

Third, and linked to the second point, MPs must maintain and demonstrate a clear understanding of legal framework, higher plans and higher commanders’ intent; so they understand the laws and orders they are enforcing and the wider context on which they may need to base their actions in emergent situations.

## Conclusion

The increased deployability of the AFP and other police services, as well as the formation of ADFIS, have raised questions over the importance of Law Enforcement as a skill of operational MPs. Law Enforcement – both maintenance of discipline and domestic Law Enforcement – is essential to the conduct of modern operations, particularly stability operations. At the same time, some policing tasks are so military in nature that there will be no choice but to assign them to MPs rather than civilian police. While MPs are not the only force capable of providing Law Enforcement in operational theatres, they represent a general duties policing capability that is deployable beyond the range (in space and threat) of civilian police, in numbers that make them more available and persistent than ADFIS. Thus, they have significant contributions to make in both maintenance of discipline and domestic Law Enforcement. In order for this

<sup>23</sup> First Lieutenant Audrey Latorre, ‘Military Police as Soldier Diplomats,’ Military Police Bulletin, April 2006, accessed at <http://www.wood.army.mil/mpbulletin/>.

<sup>24</sup> Latorre, Op Cit.

<sup>25</sup> Patrick Delaforce, *The Battle of the Bulge: Hitler’s Final Gamble*, Pearson Education Limited, Harlow, 2004, p 61.

<sup>26</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Trent Scott, ‘Defeating Insurgencies: Adaptive Campaigning and an Australian Way of War,’ Australian Army Journal, Winter 2008, p 209. Superintendent Dahlstrom (Op cit at p 14) takes a similar view.

<sup>27</sup> The writer’s potentially biased opinion on this matter is supported by the Post Operation Report, Operation Anode, 2003. This is a restricted document, but the wording included has been cleared as ‘unclassified’ with COMD CTF 635 Rotation 1.

<sup>28</sup> Brian Polley, ‘Training Leaders for Interagency Cooperation,’ Ch 14 in Jay W. Boggs and Joseph R. Cerami, *The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Aligning and Integrating Military and Civilian Roles in Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2008, p 444, accessed at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=828>

<sup>29</sup> Australian Senate, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee Op cit.





to be a credible capability, all MPs, not just those assigned to ADFIS, must maintain their proficiency in Law Enforcement. With proficiency in Law Enforcement comes a Law Enforcement ethos. Maintaining such an ethos will not only promote effective Law Enforcement by MPs, it will enhance the other three MP functions as well as interoperability with civilian police. MPs must also maintain their ability to execute tasks in concert with combat forces and in keeping with command requirements in all operational environments. There will often be no choice but to use operational MPs for Law Enforcement on operations. MPs have no choice but to be ready.

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# The Use of Military Police In Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN)

By Major Michael Pemberton

The aim of this paper is to initiate discussion in the use of Australian Military Police in supporting ADF counterinsurgency operations. The paper does not recommend a way ahead but highlights that Military Police offer a unique contribution to support ADF counterinsurgency operations.

*“The evolution of complex warfighting has resulted in an increasing blend of military and police action within a complex environment shaped by military, humanitarian and diplomatic activity. As the Land Force seeks to conduct the five lines of operation within the Adaptive Campaigning framework, the versatile structure, training and equipment of the Military Police (MP) is fundamental to the provision of commensurate force options across the full spectrum of operations.”*

‘AAN Military Police Concept Paper April 2008’

## Historical Background

The Australian Army’s involvement in countering insurgency is not new, and in fact can be traced back to the early years of the Cold War. However our experience was based on World War II jungle warfare traditions. From the mid – 1950s until the early 1970s, Australian soldiers engaged in counterinsurgency operations in Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam.

The experience gained from the jungle warfare tradition in New Guinea and the Malayan tropical counterinsurgency experience played an important role in preparing the Army’s independent Task Force for operations in Phuoc Tuy Province in South Vietnam between 1966 and 1972.

The 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) was very successful in its operations against insurgents through its persistent presence, constant patrolling, search and destroy missions and pacification techniques.

Defence Policy following Australia’s withdrawal from Vietnam in 1972 and up until 1997, forced Army to shift its focus from warfare in tropical conditions to continental defence, with very little focus on counterinsurgency. In 1999 Army published revised doctrine through the Manual of Land Warfare Doctrine series (Land Warfare Doctrine 3-8-4, Counterinsurgency Operations, 1999) however it was viewed as essentially being a transitional document. Since 1999 the ADF has deployed on numerous expeditionary missions; from East Timor through Afghanistan to the Solomon Islands and Iraq. Army has been confronted with rural and urban insurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan which have been shaped by newly globalised strategic conditions.

Today, the Army has identified the need to revise its counterinsurgency doctrine, which requires a revised approach in countering insurgency, incorporating current operation experiences but retaining those tried and tested enduring aspects.

## Defining the issues

Insurgency and its tactics are as old as warfare itself. Joint doctrine defines an insurgency as an organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. Stated another way, an insurgency is an organised, protracted

politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government occupying power, or other political authority, while increasing insurgent control. Governments can be overthrown in a number of ways. An unplanned explosion of popular will, for example, might result in a revolution like that in France in 1789. At another extreme is the coup d’état, where a small group of plotters replace state leaders with little support from the people at large. Insurgencies generally fall between these two extremes. They normally seek to achieve one of two goals: to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power within a single state, or to break away from state control and form an autonomous entity or ungoverned space that they can control. Insurgency is typically a form of internal war, one that occurs primarily within a state, not between states, and one that contains at least some elements of civil war.<sup>1</sup> It is of interest that in recent times we have seen the rise of religiously motivated insurgents, which has created an operational challenge for Western armies. This has resulted in adapting operational methods to meet specific cultural and socio-political conditions.

Counterinsurgency is defined as those political, social, civic, economic, psychological, and military actions taken to defeat an insurgency. All insurgencies are unique in their political, social and historical contexts and they demand that the counterinsurgent adapt with skill and knowledge to meet specific socio-political and military conditions. Counterinsurgency

<sup>1</sup> US Army Counterinsurgency FM 3-24 December 2006, Chapter 1



is a politically motivated, intelligence-driven activity, the aim of which is to win the support of the population. In any counterinsurgency military power must be applied as peacefully as possible and as forcefully as necessary. The Australian Army has conducted counterinsurgency campaigns in Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam, however more recent campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq and lessons learned from those campaigns have led to the development of new doctrine.

Policing is of vital importance in countering insurgency as it is a politically motivated, intelligence-driven activity. The primary aim of the insurgent is to destroy law and order, therefore counterinsurgency quite clearly requires a functioning police force; however in most cases civil police have been confronted by levels of armed violence that are beyond their capacity. Hence the most appropriate response involves the deployment of a military force in aid of the civil power. In countering insurgency the primary function of the operating force is establishing the Rule of Law (RoL). This is a complex endeavour that, depending on the security situation, can range from military units to civilian and international agencies leading.

Successful counterinsurgency operations combine offensive, defensive, stability and enabling activities to achieve the stable and secure environment needed for effective governance, essential services and economic development. The Australian Army has adopted a single approach to counterinsurgency, known as the clear-hold-build (the 'oil stain') approach. This technique comprises clearing and holding an area in order to achieve the lines of effort then expanding into other insurgent or contested areas. This represents the 'spreading out' of the oil stain.<sup>2</sup> It is all about separating the insurgent from the population and this can be achieved by either, killing, capturing or




Figure 1: Adaptive Campaigning - Lines of Operations

removing the insurgents. Ultimately and initially a legitimate and effective Host Nation (HN) justice program integrating law enforcement, the judiciary, and a penal system must exist. It is all about 'winning the hearts and minds of the indigenous population' to counter the insurgents. The existing justice program may be limited by capability (leadership and training), resources, or corruption, and therefore require direct or indirect efforts to support or even re-establish police services, courts, and prisons.

### The Australian Approach

Traditionally, the Australian Army has deployed forces for conventional war, counterinsurgency, stabilisation, peace support and humanitarian tasks. Each of these operations has been covered by separate tactical doctrines (e.g. Civil-Military Cooperation, Low Level Operations, Peace Support Operations and Counterinsurgency). Today, these strict doctrinal distinctions do not reflect reality. A key result is that earlier distinctions between low-, medium- and high-intensity

conflict are no longer relevant – especially at the tactical level. Therefore, land forces deployed on any operation will need access to an appropriate array of lethal and non-lethal weapons, be protected, equipped and structured to operate and survive in a potentially lethal environment while being capable of performing diverse concurrent humanitarian, counterinsurgency and peace support tasks. As a result, a single comprehensive concept is needed to integrate combat, stabilisation, reconstruction, counterinsurgency, security, civil-military cooperation, and humanitarian and peace support operations and to account for the adaptive nature of warfare. This comprehensive concept is known as *Adaptive Campaigning*.<sup>3</sup> It must be remembered at this time if Australia entered into a counterinsurgency operation, whether as a lead agency, joint or part of a multinational force it would be part of a whole – of – government approach.<sup>4</sup> This whole-of-government approach requires the establishment of clear lines of responsibility between and within government agencies, including the ADF, and mechanisms for

<sup>2</sup> Australian Army LWD 3-0-1 Counterinsurgency, 2008, Chapter 7, p. 7-15

<sup>3</sup> Adaptive Campaigning, FLW Branch Army Headquarters, Canberra, 2007, Executive Summary

<sup>4</sup> Adaptive Campaigning, FLW Branch Army Headquarters, Canberra, 2007, p.4 Adaptive Campaigning describes war in its entirety; it focuses specifically on the Land Force response within a theatre of operation, as part of a military contribution to a Whole of Government campaign.

<sup>5</sup> Adaptive Campaigning, FLW Branch Army Headquarters, Canberra, 2007

<sup>6</sup> Adaptive Campaigning, FLW Branch Army Headquarters, Canberra, 2007

<sup>7</sup> Australian Army LWD 3-0-1 Counterinsurgency, 2008, Chapter 7, p. 7-3



engaging with the private sector and non-government organisations.

In developing a campaign plan the military objectives and campaign planning remain subordinate to and support the achievement of the ultimate aim: a political solution to the insurgency. The HN ability to govern will determine the different inter-agency assets that will be required to achieve a desired strategic outcome. The campaign plan will include the use of multiple Lines of Effort (LOE)<sup>6</sup> – joint land combat; population protection; public information and information actions; population support; and indigenous capacity building – which will ensure unity between joint, inter-agency, multinational and host nation forces. It should be noted that LOE were previously known as Lines of Operations (LOO), and the term LOO is still referred to in current published doctrine.

Campaign design and planning will provide LOE with decisive points targeting the insurgent's centre of gravity. Combat functions need to be synthesised along the lines of effort to achieve the decisive points. Decisive points are unlikely to be geographically focused, but rather related to security, governance or infrastructure.<sup>7</sup>

Counterinsurgency draws on the broad range of capabilities within the joint force. The ADF must be prepared to conduct a concurrent mixture of offensive, defensive, stability and enabling activities, supported by tactical actions and tasks that may differ from conventional operations. The Army's single approach 'the clear- hold-build' has three distinct objectives. Firstly create a secure physical and psychological environment; secondly establish firm government control of the population and area; and thirdly gain the population's support by building the legitimacy of the host nation government.

## Host Nation Policing

Whether operating in a failing or failed state, acts of violence will be the major

feature that requires priority control. The responsibility for policing may fall initially to a multinational coalition force and their efforts must be coordinated with the HN and closely synchronised with other civil-military actions. The support to law enforcement may be limited to coordinate actions at local levels between the multinational force and the HN (for example, joint patrols and co-location of military and HN at police stations) or it may require a more comprehensive support program to national and regional police headquarters and technical departments, if they exist. In a collapsed state the multinational coalition force may be charged with the responsibility of re-establishing police services, courts and prisons from first principles.

Traditionally, civilian police forces are optimised for law enforcement operations and will only be deployed in a permissive environment. In contrast, combined arms teams (CAT), whilst able to operate through the threat spectrum, are optimised for combat operations in a medium to high threat environment. MP provide a force element with the skills, equipment and communications which will assist commanders in providing options and effects to fill this capability gap across the threat spectrum.

The initial response to any counterinsurgency is to restore law and order and allow the HN government to take control. Here lies the predicament. Civil police may be initially unable to restore law and order without the aid of the military; however the military is not trained as police officers. Both elements must complement each other in the initial stages, with the military taking responsibility for putting down the insurgency but not assuming the responsibility of being the police force.

## The Military's Role

It is essential that counterinsurgency forces operate within the framework of the RoL. Failing to observe the RoL in the name of

military expediency is always counter-productive. Unlawful actions by counterinsurgency forces will alienate the local population and may create situations where, despite military success insurgent forces win important propaganda victories that strengthen their political cause. Rectitude<sup>8</sup> is a vital part of counterinsurgency campaigning. The ADF approach, when committed to countering insurgency operations, is the employment of Infantry and Special Forces to assist to re-establish security. Australian Military Police have been used sparingly in recent campaigns, possibly due to limited manning but more likely than not because it is not seen that Military Police (MP) can play a vital operational role in these types of campaigns.

## How Military Police can support the Lines of Effort (LOE)

MP play a vital role in providing support across all five LOE by bringing a robust and dynamic capability during counterinsurgency operations. MP possess the diverse mobility capabilities, lethality in weapons mix, and trained communications skill to operate in any environment (permissive or non permissive), as well as bringing to the mix a highly trained and equipped organisation to support the critical components of restoring and maintaining law and order.

**Joint Land Combat** - includes actions to secure the environment, remove organised resistance and set conditions for the other lines of operation. It may include close combat under contemporary conditions in complex, particularly urban, terrain. MP maintain a capacity to provide combat policing support to combat forces operating in a medium to high threat environment.

**Population Protection** - includes actions to provide immediate protection and security to threatened populations in order to set the conditions for the re-establishment of law and order. MP provide a vast and diverse array of specialist MP support to the broad

<sup>8</sup> Rectitude as defined: Rightness of principle or practice; exact conformity to truth, or to the rules prescribed for moral conduct, either by divine or human laws; uprightness of mind; uprightness; integrity; honesty; justice

<sup>9</sup> Screening activities involve traffic control measures, mobile patrols, surveillance, and exploitation of electronic warfare.



spectrum of policing operations (identification, apprehension, detention and assistance with prosecution).

**Public Information** - includes actions to inform and shape the perceptions, attitudes, behaviour and understanding of target populations groups. MP engagement with the local population (target audience) as part of various policing functions enables the open narrative and/or targeted message to be disseminated, thus shaping audience perceptions, behaviour and actions.

**Population Support** - includes actions to provide essential services to effected communities IOT relieve immediate suffering and positively influence the population and their perceptions. MP contribution to the restoration and maintenance of law and order provides effected communities with an essential service that relieves suffering, facilitates the provision of humanitarian assistance, and positively shapes the perceptions of the local populace.

**Indigenous Capacity Building** - includes actions to nurture the establishment of civilian governance, which may include local and central government, security, police, legal, financial and administrative systems. The contribution of MP to Police - Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (P-OMLT) responsible for the development of key indigenous policing, legal and security stakeholders, facilitates the effective transition of responsibility, and contributes to the success of the Land Force exit strategy.

### How Military Police support can enhance Combat Functions

MP support commanders at all levels through the conduct of policing activities. Specifically these are enabling functions that are conducted by designated military personnel who are organised, trained and equipped using specialised MP techniques. These enabling functions are Law Enforcement (LE), Internment and

Detention Operations (IDOPS), Mobility and Manoeuvre Support (MMS) and Security which are conducted across the full spectrum of operations. MP can enhance combat functions in the following manner:

**Know.** MP enhance the commander's capacity to predict, detect, identify and understand the strengths, vulnerabilities and opportunities available within the battlespace by the application of intelligence-led policing. Through the conduct of criminal investigations, IDOPS, liaison with the local population and civil LE agencies, and screening activities,<sup>9</sup> MP are a valuable and diverse source of varied information. The gathering of police information and criminal intelligence (CRIMINT) provide a different perspective to the battlespace. MP provide police information and CRIMINT to intelligence staff for incorporation into the IPB process. In developing a Concept of Operations, the commander needs to know the criminal threat and associated risks that exist within the battlespace.

**Shape.** The ability to engage in actions that enhance the friendly force's position, delay protagonist's response, or lead them into an inadequate or inappropriate response allows the commander to shape the battlespace for any decisive action. In a complex warfighting environment, shaping actions are complicated by the multiplicity of 'key players' who must be shaped. Where a force is deployed in a failed state, the military force is likely to be the only law and order available. The provision of police information and CRIMINT from the conduct of LE and IDOPS contributes to the commander's ability to shape the battlespace.

**Strike.** To strike is to apply tailored effects in a timely fashion, requiring the precise integration and application of force at selected points in the battlespace to achieve specific outcomes. Where a traditional military force may consider the detention or apprehension of non-traditional adversaries

(such as insurgents, terrorists and criminal elements) as an endstate, MP consider the successful prosecution of such threat elements as the endstate. Subsequently, the ability of MP to strike involves the application of precise, discriminate and tailored non-lethal effects by integrated combat and joint interagency elements to identify, apprehend, detain and subsequently successfully prosecute threat elements that are not considered combatants and to which the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) do not apply. Additionally, the conduct of LE, MMS and Security functions by MP facilitates the tactical freedom of action for combat forces to conduct 'conventional' strike actions.

**Shield.** To shield is to protect friendly forces and infrastructure, through avoiding detection, and protection against physical or electronic attack. The employment of MMS (Route Control), LE (Constabulary Operations) and Security (CPP and MPD) facilitates the tactical freedom of action for combat forces. Additionally, MP shield Land Force personnel and infrastructure through the use of policing information and CRIMINT to detect and identify potential areas of criminal activity, and contribute to the successful prosecution of non traditional adversaries.

**Adapt.** To adapt is to respond effectively to changing situations or tasks that arise from the dynamic, chaotic and interactive nature of warfighting. The three block war concept<sup>10</sup> details that a military force must have the ability to change from one line of operation to another rapidly. It also implies that military forces must have the ability to conduct Constabulary Operations concurrently with Joint Land Combat. This is achieved by MP coordination of military, civilian and indigenous law enforcement agencies to meet the challenges of the changing threat situation.

**Sustain.** To sustain is to provide appropriate and timely support to all forces

<sup>10</sup> Charles C. Krulak, 31st Commandant of the US Marine Corps, described the Three Block War as the requirement for military forces to assist in the distribution of humanitarian aid on one block, prosecute stabilisation / peacekeeping roles on the second block and conduct high-intensity conventional warfighting on the third block.

<sup>11</sup> US Army Counterinsurgency FM 3-24, December 2006, Chapter 5.



through deployment, conduct of the mission and redeployment. The ability of a force to transition rapidly through the spectrum of conflict and into Indigenous Capacity Building is greatly enhanced by a state's ability to restore law and order, judicial processes and administration. This is best achieved by the use of interagency policing capabilities to raise, train and enhance the indigenous capacity to restore and maintain law and order.

**Engage.** To engage is to interact with the population within the battlespace in a direct or indirect manner to facilitate the exchange of information that may be used in the conduct of operations across the Land Force lines of operations. MP engage with the local populace in the execution of various functions and tasks. Engagement with the local populace (target audience) enables the open narrative and/or targeted message to be disseminated in order to shape perceptions and actions.

MP are trained as police, and whilst they may not have the familiarity in some vital aspects of civilian policing (such as homicide investigation) they are experienced and able to operate within the framework of the law. They are trained in the identification, collection and subsequent presentation of evidence before any legal proceedings, which includes the arrest procedure for Persons of Interest (POI), being those who are suspected of committing criminal offences, which will include the insurgents. One of the major failings of recent counterinsurgency operations has been the inability to convict those persons arrested when brought before a court. In most cases it has been because the emphasis was not put into the collection of evidence and the subsequent appearance before a court, but rather that of apprehension and detaining the suspects/offenders. Their actual functions will be dependant upon the HN's ability to govern.



### US Army Military Police Dogs searching for explosives in Iraq

MP, as a combat support force multiplier, provide essential operational assistance to combat elements and commanders through the provision of varied MP effects which contribute to providing the tactical freedom the Land Force needs to achieve its mission. The restoration and maintenance of law and order within a population facilitates dominance of the Army narrative and enhances decision superiority over the Land Force's opponents. In these ways MP contributes to the dislocation and denial of the enemy and/or non traditional adversary, and prevents them from imposing such effects on our own forces.

### The US Military Police Experience

The United States 18th Military Police Brigade supporting Operation Iraqi

Freedom demonstrated the diversity and flexibility of military police functions by conducting over 24,000 combat patrols; processed over 3,600 enemy prisoners of war, detainees, and insurgents; confiscated over 7,500 weapons; and trained over 10,000 Iraqi police officers. Military Police patrols came under direct or indirect attack over 300 times throughout the operation.<sup>11</sup>

The US Army Centre for Lessons Learned recently deployed a Collection and Analysis Team (CAAT) into Iraq to look at Military Police operations in support of the manoeuvre commander in Counterinsurgency Operations and to support a Chief of Staff of the US Army (CSA) requirement to look at developing an organisation whose mission is to assist a developing country in professionalising its police forces and establishing rule of law. A review of current operations within Iraq indicated that the MP mission will continue to grow in complexity, especially within a COIN environment. The major finding of the report is that enhancing the law enforcement skills, capabilities, and resources available to the MP will contribute significantly to the success of operations in complex warfare that the US Army faces now and will face in the future.<sup>12</sup>



SGT Zane Foley 1 MP Bn assisting AFP Police in East Timor<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> US Army Initial Impressions Report (IIR) on Operation Iraqi Freedom dated 22 Jul 2008, which discusses the use of US Military Police and Counterinsurgency Operations.

<sup>13</sup> 'The Role of the Military Police in Enhancing ADF-AFP Interoperability', a paper by Captain Damian Eaton, unpublished. p. 13.

<sup>14</sup> 'The Role of the Military Police in Enhancing ADF-AFP Interoperability', a paper by Captain Damian Eaton, unpublished. p. 13.

<sup>15</sup> 'The Role of the Military Police in Enhancing ADF-AFP Interoperability', a paper by Captain Damian Eaton, unpublished. p. 13-14



## Australian Military Police Experience

Further examples closer to home and more recently, include the Australian Defence Force (ADF) involvement in the Solomon Islands and Timor Leste. Whilst it can be argued that the ADF involvement in Timor Leste, both in 1999 and in 2006 does not fit entirely within the definition of Insurgency, (therefore not Counterinsurgency operations) it does present an opportunity to identify and compare MP functions, whether in peace keeping; peace making, stability, and or security operations.

Australian Military Police (MP) were present at the time of intense civil unrest that occurred in May 2006 in Timor Leste (TL) when fighting broke out between the Timor Leste Defence Force (F-FDTL) and the Timor Leste National Police Force (PNTL) over the sacking of 595 F-FDTL soldiers. The unrest resulted in the collapse of law and order, security and judicial frameworks throughout the country.<sup>14</sup> MP were also involved in the Australian led International Force East Timor (INTERFET) Mission in 1999, and on both occasions MP supported the operations through LE, MMS, SOPS and IDOPS.

In 2006 Australian MP conducted joint patrols with the Australian Federal Police (AFP); provided arrest and detention support to AFP and the Battle Group (BG) cordon and search operations; Military Police Dog (MPD) support to AFP General Duties (GD) Operations; gave support to the conduct of investigations by AFP and the United Nations Police (UNPOL) and assisted with the collection and preservation of evidence, under LE.

They also established and maintained a Defence Detention Facility (DDF); a Detention Management Team (DMT); provided support to the re-establishment of the TL judicial system; and reviewed and amended the JTF 631 SOPs on Apprehension, Search, Disarmament and detention IOT align with the TL Criminal Procedure Code. Further

Military Police supplied C2 support to BG Population Protection and Control (PPC)

operations; Close Personal Protection (CPP) to key TL Government Ministers and other VIPs; physical security of the Dili District Court; and MP GD and MPD capabilities to the Commander's Reserve Force.<sup>15</sup> This was not a bad effort for a MP GD platoon with attached MPD, CPP and investigator capabilities and demonstrates the MP policing capability.

With a future developed capability involving protection, mobility and lethal/non-lethal firepower, MP capability will enable it to operate as a small, semi-autonomous team across all five lines of operation at all levels. A comprehensive array of lethal and non-lethal weapon systems/munitions will enable MP to apply precise, discriminate and tailored effects commensurate with the complex conflict environment. Additionally, they will provide MP with the capacity to adapt to tasks across the spectrum of conflict, including domestic operational tasking, within a coalition and/or joint-interagency framework. Enhanced networked and interoperable communication systems will provide the individual and collective MP element with devolved situational awareness and capacity for small-team Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).

## Conclusion

Australian MP support to counterinsurgency operations or for that fact any support to operations, will always be constrained, not because of capability, but by manning, and perhaps the perceived presumption that they do not value add. Whilst it is identified that MP, given their specialist capabilities that they possess, would be an ideal 'Force of Choice', realistically, given the current size of the Australian Defence Force and in particular RACMP, it is highly unlikely that we could fill the role of the 'Force of Choice'. However, that said MP do have a vital role to play in counterinsurgency operations. Manning should never predicate the further development of our capabilities and we should strive to develop those capabilities for the betterment of the Army and in particular RACMP. Areas of interest for further development should be defining

and developing Combat Policing; Police Intelligence Operations; Interoperability with other agencies, in particular AFP; the further development of Crime Scene Examination for the Collection of Forensic Evidence; and the use of MPD in drug operations, to name a few.

This paper draws upon information from current Australian Army Doctrine (LWD 3-0-1 Counterinsurgency, 2008); and US Army Doctrine (US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM 3-24) as well as a recent US Army Initial Impressions Report (IIR) on Operation Iraqi Freedom dated 22 Jul 2008, which discusses the use of US Military Police and Counterinsurgency Operations. It also draws on information from the 2020-2040 Army After Next (AAN) Military Police Concept Paper of April 2008, and a paper written by Captain Damian Eaton, Adjutant 1 MP Battalion on 'The Role of the Military Police in Enhancing ADF-AFP Interoperability'



**Author: MAJ Michael Pemberton is the Deputy Provost Marshal – Army. He enlisted in the ARA in January 1973 and has served in various postings within RACMP over the past 35 years.**



# Command and Leadership on Operations

## By Captain Nathan Pierpoint

As an officer having gone through both ADFA and RMC, I was constantly told during my training that *“the ultimate goal for all officers is to command on operations”* and *“your defining moments as an officer will be what you do on operations”*. All officers, at one point in their career, aspire to these goals and relish the opportunity to apply their knowledge and skill on operations, and to borrow a phrase used recently by one of my instructors from RMC in the Australian Army Journal MAJ Jim Hammett; *“...on the footy field and not just in training”*.

I have been fortunate enough to deploy on a number of operations and have had exposure to a wide-ranging scope of military capabilities throughout my time in the Army. Each experience was valuable in its own way, but more-so, important in my development and understanding of the wider Army process and where Officers, dependant on rank, fit in. Whilst the Army continues to grow and adapt to the changing face of global military operations, it is vital to the survival of our Corps to capture the knowledge and information collected by members fortunate enough to deploy on *all* recent operations. Furthermore, it is pertinent in today's broad operational spectrum to discuss and evaluate the operational leadership capabilities of officers in this Corps, and its direct correlation to the effectiveness of a deploying contingent.

The following are a number of key skills which I believe are vital for commanders, especially those within this Corps, to possess whilst on operations. I note that most of the people who read this will think of my experiences as somewhat limited, and in many cases, as with the constant changes in global military conflict, *my* ideals of the skills of officers on operations may change. This is designed for those junior officers, in

command of troops, seeking the guidance and the strength to effectively command on operations. I will attempt to discuss a number of issues in no particular order.

### Junior development

Commanders need to have the conviction to make decisions that provide best support to their superiors and their own soldiers; more-so, individuals need to have the confidence and the maturity to make important decisions based purely off a commander's intent. MP NCO's need to have an excellent grasp of the commander's intent whether it is task or mission specific. Through this, the soldiers need to build the confidence to make necessary decisions without your physical presence and guidance. Similarly, they need to develop the necessary communication skills to be able to converse and interact with senior commanders and other prominent persons with confidence. You need to ensure that your subordinates will reinforce the aims and goals defined by your mission to ensure success. Pre-deployment training, as a matter of priority, should focus on the development of these skills in the junior members of your element.

Within this training you should ensure that *all* your subordinates have a good grasp of the MAP and what is required in the development of plans and orders for your own element, and for the larger contingent. Members should be confident in the delivery of orders and have the conviction to deliver appropriate guidance to contingent commanders during the MAP in order to ensure MP aims and goals are met. I tried to ensure that at least one NCO (or SNCO) attended the MAP with me while on OP RELEX II and SECDET; this not only ensured development within the member, but also provided me as the MP Commander with someone to develop my own IMAP with when necessary.

Discussions on the MAP will feature heavily in the next important subject for MP Officers.

### Planning and decision making

Commanders need to be extremely flexible and adaptive with your plans during operations. Essentially, what may be the norm within your operational environment at the present time has the potential to change within a matter of days to weeks. Every time I have deployed I have received a handover from the last MP, it seems as though the battle space has managed to change within a fortnight. As a flow on, attempting to 'template' a task from your predecessors has its own limitations. You need to keep in mind that every individual soldier will do one thing or another slightly different from the next, and therefore every section, platoon and team will have its own way of achieving a task. In addition, your next section, platoon or team will inevitably do things differently from the way you may have done it previously. Note that whilst it may be different from what you are used to, it's not to say it's wrong and what's more, may even be an improvement from how you have done it before.

As a commander you need to bare in mind during your planning consideration the capabilities of the individuals and the capabilities of your team as a whole. Some people will naturally be able to do things better than others and some will be able to work better with one person(s) than another. Be cognisant of what you are trying to achieve and be confident in making an informed decision. I was reminded of this constantly whilst on SECDET where the Americans had signs everywhere saying:

*“We need leadership, not likership!”*

As the comment above implies, leaders have to make the right decision, in a timely fashion, to ensure mission success. Be careful when making your decisions that you don't





become too friendly with your own soldiers, especially in order to offset the hard decisions your superiors make, in order to make you look good. Destabilising the command chain leads to fractures in the operational capability of the wider combat team (if you are in this sort of setting) and has the potential to make a deployment drag. Environmental and personal issues will affect your soldier's ability enough during a prolonged operation; issues with the command chain only further deteriorate your elements operational effectiveness.

What's more, you should be attempting to influence your commander's decision making process during the MAP to ensure these tough decisions are few and far between. MP Officers need to ensure that they are heavily involved in the MAP whether you are commanding MP soldiers or on individual deployment. MP Officers need to ensure they have an excellent grasp of the MAP and all facets of planning development not just on an individual scale but more importantly in the combined arms environment. If you are in a combined arms environment, you should get to know fellow commanders and the capabilities they provide to ensure that you are part of the effective synchronising of battle space effects when required.

Fore mostly, MP Commanders need to be open-minded. Your subordinates will more than likely have done something similar on operations previously, and their ideas need to be considered, superiors will want to add their influence on your operation, and the environment will inevitably ensure that your best laid plans change as soon as you leave the compound.

### Maintenance of performance levels

Drops in performance levels or the development of an unwillingness to enhance the capability you provide, depletes the image of professionalism and the maintenance of your commanders COG – your hard target posture. The image you display and the target you and your element displays has a direct affect on how others view the image and status of the Army; once you start to break these down, the enemy will prey on your vulnerabilities as you are now seen as a soft target. I saw this during SECDDET when the Polish Ambassador's convoy was hit by a very well planned and executed complex ambush. Essentially, the Polish team became lazy over time, and when

planning routes used the same stretch of roadway using the same tactics and drills for a number of weeks because they felt it was easier than going through the more heavily trafficked areas. This reinforced the need to maintain standards of professionalism and to remain as flexible and adaptive as possible and to *review* current procedures *often*.

### Performance reviews

Constantly underrated, and especially during operations, performance reviews whether it be individual or team orientated, serve as a great tool to enhance the group dynamic and maintain a group's operational tempo throughout a deployment. In addition, the review of current TTP's and SOP's serve as a vital tool in the maintenance of your commander's intent and the effectiveness of the service you provide your superiors. The 'comfortable niche' is a pet hate of mine and something that I despise seeing individuals and teams fall into. A 'comfortable niche' will see soldiers and teams become complacent, sometimes cocky and often careless. The review of an individuals and teams performance will allow a commander time to resolve recent issues, inform soldiers of reasons why certain things have changed and look at ways of improving the overall effectiveness of your element. It should be at this point as well that you discuss openly with your senior NCO(s) the command teams performance and points that require resolution whether individually or collectively.


### Maintenance of SOP's and TTP's

ADF operations, at least ones that the RACMP are involved in, are never run by stringent doctrine, nor should they expect to be. Commanders at all levels interpret the manoeuvrist theory to warfare and a particular doctrinal guideline differently to ensure the effect an element has during the operation supports mission success. Senior commanders will have the flexibility to adapt and mould the battle space and the effect their elements have within it in their own way, using doctrine as a *guide*. Environmental impacts within your deployed AO will determine the operational and tactical functions of ADF elements. It is up to MP Commanders to reflect this adaptability within their plans and functions', ensuring their conduct reflects your commander's intent and overall mission. In addition, you should be informing superiors

of changes to the environment and subsequent effects it has on your capability, and your ability to complete your mission. This will help to shape senior commanders thinking on the development of the conflict and subsequent effects they can apply to the battle space.

So what does this mean for you and your MP's? It means that your SOP's and TTP's need to be constantly updated and reviewed IOT ensure the team can provide the highest level of performance they can. Look at ways other Australian or even coalition elements are conducting similar roles and functions IOT enhance your own capability. Review recent incidents (you were involved in or others like you) and intelligence trends to make a more informed decision of how your SOP's and TTP's were either (un)successful or could be applied within your framework IOT provide a better capability to your commanders.

In conclusion, there are many skills an MP Officer should possess whilst deployed on operations. Many have not been included above however, these are some of the most important skills I believe commanders should possess in light of recent conflict and subsequent ADF operations. Remember that your subordinates are the most important asset you have, and their impact on the success of the mission is a direct correlation of your ability to lead them through all facets of an operation. In closing, focus on your mission and take everything you can from your operational experiences while you have the chance!



**Author:** CAPT Nathan Pierpoint accepted into ADFA in 1999 and graduated from RMC in 2002 being corps allocated to RACMP. He undertook regimental training with 3 RAR in 2003 and was posted to HQ 1 MP Bn in 2004. He was posted to 11 Pl and 3 MP Coy between 2004 and 2006 and is currently the OPSO at Charlie Coy 1 MP Bn.



# End of an Era for RACMP – Defence Cooperation Program Vanuatu



**By Major Dave McGarry**

Vanuatu, “the happiest place on earth” so the travel shows on TV advise! Two years ago Vanuatu was one of those dream holiday destinations that you only read about in the glossy travel magazines. The Corps somehow had a posting location that was on everyone’s wish list, but really it is a posting that not much is known about. I certainly didn’t know too much about the Defence International Engagement Program and the intricacies of the Defence Cooperation Program (DCP) before taking up this appointment. I hope to provide some insight into a posting that has certainly been the highlight of my 25 year career, and for a number of other notable MP officers, possibly dispel or perpetuate some of the Corps urban myths, provide an understanding of the Corps involvement into the realm of Defence International Strategic Policy (Nation building and capacity development) and explain why an MP Officer has been posted to this Pacific Island Country.

In January 2007, accompanied by my wife and two children we arrived in Port Vila, Vanuatu, to take up our two year posting as the Joint Planning and Operations Centre (JPOC) Staff Operations Adviser for the Vanuatu Police Force. For those apparently in the know I was told, “Maaaate!! its all white sandy beaches, palm trees, pina colodas and a much improved golf handicap, depending on who you spoke with of course!”

So you may ask “where the bloody hell are you?” Vanuatu is a small Pacific Island Country located about two and half hours flying time to the North East of Brisbane, formerly, known as the “New Hebrides” as named by Captain Cook (not JE Cook, although there is probably a story there somewhere). The Republic of Vanuatu gained independence from the Anglo-French Condominium in 1980 and the island nation was renamed Vanuatu. The country thrives on its Melanesian culture and heritage, with the dual English and French influence still very obvious.

The British brought colonialism while the French brought wine, pastries, cheese and driving on the wrong side of the road. Vanuatu is made up of 83



islands, 13 of which are inhabited. The Northern most islands (the Torres group) are approx 900km from the Southern most island of Anettyum.

The group land mass covers only 12,000 km<sup>2</sup>, and an ocean area of some 45,000 km<sup>2</sup>, consisting of rugged young volcanic islands. Vanuatu is situated on what is known as the Pacific "Rim of fire" and on top of two tectonic plates, which make earthquakes a very frequent occurrence and subject to frequent cyclones as it is also situated in the Pacific's "Cyclone Alley". Active volcanoes exist on five of the inhabited islands, the most accessible Mt Yasur on Tanna, with two underwater volcanoes east of Epi. Vanuatu is a Melanesian culture with a population of approx 27,000. Two-thirds of the population live in the four main Islands; Efate, Espiritu Santo, Malekula and Tanna. There is a large Expatriate community in Vanuatu with approx 3,500 in Port Vila alone (mainly NZ, Fr, UK and Aus). The Capital is Port Vila, located on the island of Efate. (45% of the population is under the age of 15, watch this space). The country will celebrate 28 years of independence on 30 July 2008 and this year also represents 25 years of ADF / DCP support to Vanuatu.

The VPF was established in 1983 when the remnants of the former pre-independence New Hebrides' Police Force and Mobile Force were amalgamated. Some of these members are still in the VPF. The average age of the VPF members is about 45. In 1983, the ADF also commenced its relationship with the Government of Vanuatu (GoV) and the Vanuatu Police Force (VPF) through mapping projects conducted by members of the Survey Corps. This expanded into developing the VPF

communications network, the provision of Pacific Class Patrol Boat in 1988 and the provision of various Advisers (RA Inf orientated).

In 1997, as a result of a GoV Strategic Review, the future direction of the VPF was set in motion and reinforced a joint and coordinated VPF. Comprising of the three distinct Force elements; the Vanuatu Mobile Force (VMF), a para-military wing based originally on a rifle company (+) structure (170 pers), the Police Maritime Wing (30 pers) and the traditional Police element comprising (GD and CID functions 350 pers). The Review proposed a Joint Force Headquarters which incorporated a Joint Planning and Operations Centre as the Commissions information hub to assist with command and control of the Force. The JPOC Adviser position was subsequently offered as a key adviser to the Commissioner and Force Executive.

Initially, the RA Inf Mobile Force Training Adviser filled this role for 12 months (1999); however, it was determined at the 1998 DCP Talks that an RACMP Officer (Major) was the more appropriate support to this area of the DCP and the newly created VPF Joint Force Headquarters and JPOC. Although Major Chris Ostapenko, (1997-98) was the first RACMP Officer appointed to Vanuatu he did not serve in the JPOC Staff Operations Adviser position.

The JPOC is an integral element of the VPF JFHQ and provides the basis for the National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC) in times of natural disaster and humanitarian response operations. The JPOC has a centralised coordinating function, something that is difficult to

achieve in a Melanesian culture that thrives on Pacific Island Time, 'wontok and Chiefly systems', further complicated by the Vanuatu archipelago being geographically dispersed throughout 80+ Islands.

The JPOC Adviser role is to assist the VPF establish a functional JPOC that meets the Vanuatu Police Commissioner's command, control, communications and information management requirements. This principally involves the provision of advice to the Commissioner of Police, Deputy Commissioner, Police Executive, Force element commanders and JPOC Staff. The appointment also has Project Management responsibilities (up to \$415K in FY08/09) related to capacity building/strengthening, infrastructure and skills development for the VPF/JPOC.

Additionally, the appointment carries representational responsibilities as the Senior ADF Representative in Vanuatu (the Defence Adviser South Pacific COL (E) resides in Suva) and therefore the appointment has command responsibilities as the Head of the Defence and DCP staff. The Defence team Vanuatu consists of two RAN Advisers (LCDR and CPO) through Pacific Patrol Boat Program, the MF Trg Adviser (RA Inf Maj) and the Defence Section Staff at the High Commission (DA Assist CPO and a locally employed civilian). This also has me working very closely with the High Commissioner, DFAT staff, AusAID, International Policy Division and other Canberra based Defence organisations, as well as GoV officials and the resident Diplomatic Corps. The appointment is diverse and challenging to say the least.

What have I been up to in my 18 months





in Paradise you may ask? Well it started with a bang on 03 March 07, with the Blacksands Riots (inter-island cultural riots over black magic) in Port Vila resulting in three deaths, 25+ being hospitalised machete / bushknife related injuries the norm and substantial property damage. The GoV declared a State of Emergency which lasted eight weeks where was all this information during my Handover? We followed up with a cyclone during the Police response to the riots (we have had three cyclones so far), several major earthquakes and a tsunami have also kept me on my toes. We have also had numerous prison breaks some involving between 20 - 50 prisoners at a time, which has resulted in the local crime rate bounding out of control, an Australian EXPAT murdered and another Francophone EXPAT shot (within a 48 hr period), several related sexual assaults (involving EXPAT victims) and an escalation in general crime. The frequency of prison breaks has become a major problem in the past 12 months and the escapees have become more desperate to remain on the run, arming themselves with stolen weapons. With two other unrelated murders earlier this year (the last murder was in 2003), my support to VPF Operations has been at a premium.

On the funnier side of these issues (if there can be one) has been the experience of working closely with the VPF and understanding their cultural perspective on policing and life in general. During the latest prison break-out the GoV authorised the carriage of weapons and the Commissioner issued orders for the carriage and use of weapons during the Operation to round up the escapees. Within hours of the Operation commencing the first evening there were reports of Police shooting at escapees. On questioning the use of force requirements (or lack there of in the Orders) I was promptly reminded in the most culturally sensitive way; "Adviser, you must remember, our ancestors less than 70 years ago were cannibals, killing comes easy to us!" Only in Melanesia? Notwithstanding, the orders were re-issued with appropriate guidance.

I have also had to manage the residual DCP Comms Projects which has seen me helping the Force Comms Officer installing equipment in a number of remote islands, which allowed me to travel extensively throughout Vanuatu. I also participated in Regional Maritime Law Enforcement Operations in Tonga and Solomon Islands. I have also worked closely with the AFP/



AusAID Capacity Building Project which has been in Vanuatu for over two years now. The AFP is now the lead agency in respect of capacity development of the VPF and creating a bigger footprint across the Pacific (watch this space).

Apart from the exposure to the diverse nature of Policing in the South Pacific, kava ceremonies and Pacific Island Time, we as a family have enjoyed the cultural aspects of the South Pacific Island lifestyle and the people of Vanuatu. Kava is also one of those cultural experiences that one must become accustomed to quickly, especially as an Adviser. Other experiences like the Pentecost Island land-diving ceremony (the original bungy jumping), climbing MT Yasur Volcano and representing the ADF on ANZAC Day Dawn Services are all experiences that will live long in our memories.

As the saying goes, all good things must come to an end and in Jan 09 we will return to Australia to take up a posting to Canberra (by choice). Unfortunately and with much disappointment, this will be the end on an era for the Corps as with my departure the JPOC Adviser appointment will be disestablished (WEF 19 Jan 09). This has been the result of a change of Government in Australia and budgetary pressures applied to Defence, which has seen some 90 positions across the International Engagement Program withdrawn (three of which are from Vanuatu).

PS. I did get to play a few rounds of golf but no pina coladas.

Lukim yu long taem mifala mo family blong mi go go bak long countri blong yumi, stret nomo. Tankyu tumas.

### **RACMP Officer that have represented the Corps in Vanuatu:**

- Maj Chris Ostapenko (1997 – 1998)
- Maj Peter Fisher (2000 – 2001)
- Maj Mark Foxe (2002 – 2003)
- Maj Phil Chapman (2004 – 2006)
- Maj Dave McGarry (2007 – 2008)



Author: Major Dave McGarry enlisted into the ARA in 03 Apr 1983 and was Corps allocated to the RAA. In Apr 1988, he Corps transferred to the RACMP and has had various Corps posting within 2 MP Coy, Army SIB Unit, DMP, SIB Det Butterworth, HQ LSF, DPTC and 5 MP Coy (SIB). He was commissioned in 2001 and promoted to Major in 2006 as the Chief Instructor DPTC. In Jul 08, Major McGarry has completed 20 years service within the RACMP.